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ABSTRACT 
 
The following paper examines the ongoing political, legal and cultural debate regarding 
heroin maintenance in the U.S. that emerged after the passage of the Harrison Act. 
Moreover, it focuses on the United States very brief experimentation with narcotics 
maintenance clinics from 1914-1924 and why the clinic system was ultimately 
dismantled by the Treasury Department. This paper also highlights the U.S. public policy 
debate that emerged as early as the 1950s and continues today to develop heroin 
maintenance trials.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 Every morning Dan wakes up with the same simple task; obtaining heroin. Before 
his feet hit the floor he is contemplating his hustle for the day and wonders who is 
holding. Dan is a heroin addict and has been for the past five years.  He explains to me 
that the good days start with a hold over shot from the night before.  Dan uses heroin 
anywhere from three to ten times a day depending on how much money he is able to 
scavenge thru odd jobs, recycling, and selling small amounts of the drug to other users.  
He makes a point to explain to me that he has tried to get clean through traditional rehab, 
methadone maintenance and even incarceration. Without knowing so Dan has also just 
inadvertently described in a nutshell the current U.S. responses to heroin addiction.  Dan 
is 27 years old and is an exceptionally bright, funny and kind guy who in all sincerity 
wants to get clean but explains that he can‟t because treatment does not work for him and 
going to jail only makes him want to use more.  As we discussed the perils of heroin 
addiction I explained to him that in certain European countries such as Switzerland and 
Holland  heroin maintenance clinics were developed as an alternative for those whom 
abstinence based treatment programs were ineffective. I also informed Dan that similar 
programs were actually available in the U.S in the early 1920s as an immediate response 
to the Harrison Act, the 1914 federal legislation that criminalized drug use. Dan 
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explained to me that he had heard through the grapevine that programs like this existed 
but he though they were an urban legend.  Dan explains:  
Can you imagine if this were allowed here; do you know what this would do for me? If I 
could go to a clinic and get clean stuff I could spend the rest of my time on living like a 
normal friggin person, I could get a job, an apartment of my own, help take care of my 
daughter, and maybe even get a decent girlfriend. But that shit will never happen 
here……….not a chance.  
Dan is a pseudo name given to the interviewee. Personal Communication, 01 April 2012. 
 In all reality, Dan is perhaps right and the prospects of heroin assisted treatment in 
the U.S. are slim at best although that has not always been the case.  There was in fact a 
brief period immediately following the passage of the Harrison Act when narcotics 
maintenance clinics were developed as a partial response to opiate addiction.  The 
premise behind the clinics was if enough addicts were provided narcotics such as 
morphine and heroin at low cost then the black market supply would diminish and users 
would have more time to pursue legitimate activities such as employment and family.  
These clinics operated in cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Jacksonville, FL and 
Shreveport, LA from 1914 to 1924 until they were outlawed due to mounting pressure 
from the U.S Treasury Department. Brecher (1972) estimates that in 1921 as many as 44 
clinics offered heroin and morphine maintenance to an estimated 12,000 addicts. Some 
historians note the effectiveness of the Shreveport and Jacksonville clinics while 
opponents of heroin maintenance used the New York City facility as documented proof 
that the clinics caused far greater harm than good.  It is important to note that the New 
York City clinic‟s primary goal was to wean addicts off the drug rather than maintain 
them whereas most of the other facilities provided long-term maintenance for patients. 
Scholars note this important discrepancy along with bad organizational management was 
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largely responsible for the clinics failure (Musto, 2002; Courtwright, 1982). But, these 
reasons were largely omitted by opponents of maintenance and the failure of one clinic 
overshadowed the marked success of others.  
 Currently, the U.S. is especially resistant to the idea of heroin maintenance or 
heroin assisted treatment (HAT) yet the harm reductionist inspired program has been 
adopted in a handful of Western European countries as an alternative to traditional 
abstinence based treatment models.   Europe and the U.S. frame opiate abuse based on 
fundamentally different ideologies which is evident when we compare their drug policies.  
For instance, punitive responses stemming from the “War on Drugs” have served as a 
major catalyst in further framing addiction as primarily a criminal justice issue in the 
U.S.,  however, in countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, addiction has been 
approached from a public health standpoint that is primarily concerned with minimizing 
the harmful effects of drug abuse.  In a survey that examined Americans attitudes about 
the Drug War only 8% of respondents felt that providing legal access to heroin or cocaine 
for maintenance was acceptable (Connelly, 2010). Yet, the majority of Swiss citizens 
actually agree that heroin assisted treatment provides societal, health, and safety benefits 
for the individual addict as well as the entire community. After a decade of conducting 
HAT trials and making the program available to a small number of chronic addicts, the 
Swiss government decided to let their citizens decide the programs fate.  In 2008, Swiss 
citizens passed a referendum to make HAT a permanent treatment option for addicts and 
as result the Swiss have witnessed a marked reduction in drug related crime, decreasing 
criminal justice and health care costs and improvements of life for the individual addict 
(Perneger, Giner, del Rio and Mino 1998; Rabasa 1998).  
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 Regardless of the documented positive outcomes associated with HAT the U.S. is 
still largely dismissive of its effectiveness as a legitimate response to chronic heroin 
addiction.  It may be exceptionally surprising to many that in fact the U.S. was once a 
proponent of heroin maintenance through the use of narcotics clinics however their 
existence has been largely omitted by today‟s policy makers.  The small window in 
which narcotics clinics were utilized (1914-1924) is largely forgotten which is 
unfortunate because further examination of their effectiveness could prove beneficial in 
reopening the debate about the prospects of heroin maintenance in modern U.S. society.  
Furthermore, dismissing this element of public policy when addiction was approached 
with more tolerance only renders us less likely to develop effective, humane, and cost 
efficient  alternatives to traditional abstinence based programs that overall have low 
success rates among chronic heroin users.   
 PURPOSE OF RESEARCH   
 The primary objective of this paper is to examine the ongoing political, legal, and 
cultural debate regarding heroin maintenance in the U.S. since the passage of the 
Harrison Act.  It also highlights the historical emergence of heroin addiction in the U.S. 
and the factors that influenced early user trends. Moreover, it focuses on the United 
States‟ very brief experimentation with narcotics maintenance clinics from 1914-1924 
and discusses the reasons they were ultimately banned by the Treasury Department.  This 
paper also examines the public policy debate that emerged as early as the 1950s to 
develop heroin maintenance programs and it highlights current efforts to develop HAT 
trials in the U.S.  It is also important to note that there are but a handful of studies and 
articles that specifically deal with the United States experimentation with narcotics 
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clinics and there are even fewer that examine the trajectory of implementing heroin 
maintenance into public policy.  This paper also examines findings from heroin 
maintenance trials in Switzerland and more recently in Vancouver and accesses the 
likelihood of a U.S trial in the future.  
METHOD 
  This paper uses a historical comparative analysis to examine the ongoing debate 
surrounding heroin maintenance in the U.S. that emerged after the passage of the 
Harrison Act.  It also closely looks at the brief period in which narcotics maintenance 
clinics were utilized and why the Treasury Department who initially supported these 
efforts later took an aggressive anti-maintenance stance.  Data used in this paper were 
gathered using primary sources including: annual reports from the Narcotics Division of 
the Department of Internal Revenue, Narcotic Clinics records, Supreme Court Rulings, 
and the Treasury Departments studies regarding the prevalence of opiate addiction.  Also, 
personal accounts are presented from early addicts and physicians including Willis Butler 
who ran the Shreveport Narcotics Clinic.  This paper draws from the previous work of 
historians and drug policy experts such as Dr. David Courtwright and Dr. David Musto 
who have examined in detail the United States‟ brief experimentation with narcotics 
clinics and why the clinic system was eventually dismantled.  Additionally, it examines 
the accuracy of several pivotal studies such as Andrew DuMez‟s (1918) Some Facts 
Concerning Drug Addiction, and Hamilton Wright‟s (1910) Report on the International 
Opium Commission, both of which presented a statistical illusion that grossly 
misrepresented the prevalence of opiate addiction.  Nonetheless, these studies were 
instrumental in the passage of the Harrison Act which ultimately transformed the 
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dominant attitudes toward addiction from tolerance to criminalization.  These studies also 
had a significant impact in the ruling of two monumental Supreme Court decisions, 
United States v. Doremus and Webb v. United States.  The first upheld the 
constitutionality of the Harrison Act and redefined the physician patient relationship 
while the latter provided legal precedent that was used by the Treasury Department to 
dismantle the narcotics clinics and ultimately maintenance.   
 In addition to examining the discourse and politics of heroin maintenance this 
paper also engages with more recent policy debates to implement heroin maintenance 
trials that emerged as early as the 1950s and continued until the late 1970s when heroin 
addiction resurfaced as a serious social issue.  For example, I examine transcripts from 
the American Bar Association and American Medical Association's 1956 Joint 
Committee on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1962 White House Ad Hoc Panel on Narcotic 
Drug Abuse, both of which advocated policymakers to consider implementing 
maintenance trials. The debate regarding heroin maintenance once again laid dormant 
through much of the 1980s and 1990s as a result of the shifting conservative discourse 
that promoted “Get Tough” policies stemming from the War on Drugs (Trebach, 1982).  
Today, the prospects of heroin maintenance are once again being re-accessed due to the 
documented positive findings by the Swiss, Dutch and Canadian trials that substantiate 
the program‟s effectiveness in reducing drug related harms among high risk chronic 
users. This paper also discusses the more recent attempts to implement heroin 
maintenance trials in cities such as Baltimore and New York City and why those efforts 
ultimately failed.  When discussing heroin maintenance or heroin assisted treatment 
(HAT) it is almost implausible to do so without examining the Swiss approach. This 
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paper also presents findings from Swiss HAT trials which provides compelling evidence 
that it is feasible to maintain large numbers of addicts on heroin in a way that is 
acceptable and safe for both the individual addict and the community.    
DEFINING HEROIN ASSISTED TREATMENT 
 This paper uses the terms heroin maintenance and heroin assisted treatment 
(HAT) interchangeably, however, the term HAT was not used until the early 1990s 
whereas heroin maintenance is used largely to refer to the early U.S. clinics that operated 
from 1914-1924. Heroin assisted treatment (HAT) or heroin maintenance is a form of 
medical care that involves tightly regulated and controlled prescriptions of heroin that is 
offered to a target group of users in which opioid substitution (i.e. methadone and 
suboxone) and traditional treatment approaches have been unsuccessful (Canadian 
HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 2006).  HAT evolved based on the theory of “harm reduction” 
or “harm minimization,” which attempts to reduce the negative consequences associated 
with potentially harmful human behavior.  HAT is but one of many programs based on 
the theory of harm reduction. Others include:  safe injection sites, needle exchange 
programs, heroin assisted therapy, naloxone distribution, methadone maintenance, safe 
sex programs, and low-threshold health care services. However, this paper focuses 
predominately on heroin assisted treatment.  The movement of harm minimization or 
harm reduction has emerged largely from Western Europe and it is built on the view that 
drug policy can have goals other than reducing prevalence and that it may be appropriate 
to sacrifice some reductions in use in order to lower the adverse consequences of harmful 
behavior such as drug use (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001).  Program evaluations from the 
Swiss, Dutch, and even Vancouver‟s HAT trials found the  treatment to be effective in 
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reducing drug related harms such as: improving mental and physical health  (reducing 
exposure to HIV and Hepatitis B&C and improving psychological well-being), 
decreasing involvement in criminal activity (committing crimes as a means to obtain 
illicit drugs), improving social functioning (securing housing, employment, making drug 
free contacts and increasing leisure activities), and decreasing the use of illicit drug use 
such as street heroin and cocaine (Perneger, Giner, del Rio and Mino 1998; Farrell and 
Hall, 1998).  In spite of the compelling evidence from recent HAT evaluations indicating 
that the program is effective in reducing the societal harms that are a direct consequence 
of drug use, the U.S. remains largely unreceptive and even hostile to the idea. But a 
closer examination of our own history reveals this was not always the case.  Judging by 
todays ultra-punitive policies regarding drug use it is difficult to imagine a time when the 
U.S. had a more humanistic and progressive approach toward drug treatment that allowed 
for the maintenance of addicts through narcotics clinics.  Though that time was short 
lived and maintenance efforts were abandoned due to mounting political pressure from 
the federal government, they nonetheless mark a watershed moment in the transition from 
tolerance and acceptance of drug use to ultimately stigmatization and criminalization.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF HEROIN ADDICTION IN THE U.S. AND EARLY USER 
TRENDS 
    
 In the late 19th century opiates such as morphine were particularly favored by a 
cohort of middle-class housewives who used the drug for a range of symptoms from 
menstrual cramps to fatigue.  Opium, morphine, heroin, and cocaine could be found in 
practically every imaginable form from the traditional nostrum to coca spiked wine.  Yet, 
for the most part opiate addiction was not considered a serious social problem until it 
made its debut among the ranks of the poor working class and the Chinese (Courtwright, 
1982). Although the bulk of this chapter is centered upon the origins of heroin addiction 
and the factors that influenced it in the U.S, it would be historically misleading to omit 
the role opium smoking played in the narcotic prohibitionist movement of the early 20
th
 
century.  It is also important to briefly address morphine addiction and why this drug was 
seen as less of a threat than heroin and opium smoking. Was it possibly due to the fact 
morphine addicts were predominately older and sicker and more often middle-class 
women and Civil War veterans, whereas, early heroin addicts were mostly white poor 
working class young men and boys?  Moreover, within the span of a century the pattern 
of opiate abuse in America has been dramatically transformed to the extent it has 
reconstructed how we feel about the problem of addiction (Courtwright, 1982).  The 
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following chapter highlights this transformation by examining the emergence of heroin 
addiction in the U.S. as well as early user trends and the factors that influenced it. 
THE ADVENT OF HEROIN  
 Heroin was first synthesized by C.R Alder Wright in 1874 and was later marketed 
by Bayer Pharmaceuticals in 1898 as an amazing new drug due to its ability to weaken 
the cough reflex (JAMA, 1906).  Heroin or diamorphine is an opioid analgesic that was 
developed by adding two acetyl groups to the molecule morphine. In the medical 
community it is referred to a diamorphine, but the name heroin has become synonymous 
with its illegal use.  Physicians prescribed heroin due to its effectiveness in relieving 
symptoms related to respiratory diseases such as pneumonia, tuberculosis, and whooping 
cough which were extremely prevalent during the early 1900s (JAMA, 1906).  Heinrich 
Dreser, a German chemist for Bayer pharmaceutical company was chiefly responsible for 
launching the drug in the United States and it was initially well received by the medical 
community due to its effectiveness in relieving the cough reflex.  It is worth noting that 
Dreser was also responsible for developing aspirin which gave physicians an alternative 
to prescribe in lieu of opiates and its derivatives. 
 Heroin was first introduced as a non-habit forming drug and was used as a 
substitute for morphine and codeine and in its early years it was even touted as a „cure‟ 
for the morphine habit.  However, physicians quickly noted the addictive nature of the 
drug and by 1910 became less enthusiastic about prescribing it. It is also important to 
note that the advent of aspirin in 1899 gave physicians an alternative to prescribe in place 
of strong opiates such as morphine, codeine and heroin.  Terry and Pellens (1928) note it 
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was not until 1910 that physicians fully awoke to the danger of the drug and by that time 
a great many heroin addicts had been created inadvertently. Yet, some historians note the 
prevalence of medical heroin addicts was not as widespread as early accounts indicate.  
Pearce Baily (1916) explains that physicians were rarely responsible for introducing the 
drug to addicts. Instead, the first dose of heroin was neither pill nor hypodermic injection 
taken to alleviate some physician distress, but was a small quantity of powder „sniffed‟ 
up the nose of a young man under the direction of his peers.   
 Bailey‟s account is more reflective of available data that indicates heroin 
addiction was less likely a product of physician‟s liberal use, but instead a result of 
curiosity, dissipation or a substitute for smoking opium.  A 1918 study of medical or 
intragenic heroin use reveals that only 2 of 50 users became addicted,  yet abuse among 
non-medical users began to rise significantly as early as 1910 (Sheffel, 1918).  A second 
study conducted by Stokes (1917) found of the 18 addicts he treated 17 listed 
“companions” as the source of their addiction.  Unlike morphine which was prescribed as 
a panacea for medical conditions from depression to fatigue, heroin was almost always 
prescribed for respiratory related illnesses which limited the number of medical users.  
 A handful of scholars argue that heroin was introduced to the underworld through 
less complex channels (Kane, 1917). Some early accounts claim that heroin was given to 
prisoners in a New York state penitentiary as a remedy for cough and respiratory related 
illnesses. The word quickly spread among prisoners and then to the street that the heroin 
pills were “good dope” (Kane, 1917).  Although this story was probably true to an extent 
it was doubtful that there was a single point of entry for heroin‟s induction into the black-
market or as the narcotic of choice for the underworld.  Instead, it was a combination of 
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factors: the importation bans on opium, the restrictive policies on cocaine, companion 
recruitment, and curiosity that led many to the heroin habit.  
EARLY USER CHARACTERISTICS  
 In 1910, non-medical heroin use was mainly concentrated to New York City and 
most of its users were young, poor, white and the children of immigrants whose easy 
sociability had been developed in the gangs (Bailey, 1916).  Geographically, by 1920, 
nine out of ten heroin addicts were clustered within a 180 mile radius of Manhattan. This 
raises the question of why was New York City so vulnerable to heroin abuse at this time?  
Heroin‟s availability in New York and surrounding areas is largely attributed to the 
simple fact of geographical convenience.  According to Courtwright (1982) by 1915, 
many of the major heroin manufactures such as Merek, Bayer, and Schieffelin were 
centered in New York City.  As a result addicts and their recruits could easily divert large 
amounts of the drug into the illicit market.   
 According to Leahy (1915) the composite heroin addict was a young white male 
who lived in a New York slum or a neighboring eastern city.  He was also likely to be 
poorly educated and if he worked he likely held a blue collar job of an unskilled or 
semiskilled variety.  For example, many held employment as drivers, painters, news 
dealers, longshoremen, bell boys, and soda jerks. But, addicts were not exclusively young 
poor white males; heroin was also popular among female prostitutes, gamblers, hustlers 
and upper class professionals who had switched from opium after the importation ban.  
Many female addicts of the time listed their profession as actress but the large majority of 
users were prostitutes who lived with addicted lovers and often shared their earnings and 
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drugs together (Courtwright, 1982).  Some scholars note that heroin sniffing was a 
popular pastime among soldiers prior to WWI and opium smoking was common place for 
soldiers stationed in the Philippines (Musto, 1973). Generally, heroin and opiate abuse 
was relatively an insignificant problem for the armed forces especially when compared to 
the number of civilian addicts.  Courtwright (1982) notes, that heroin abuse was not 
exclusively limited to one group characterized by class, race or gender, but the average 
composite of an addict during the first few decades of the 20th century was likely first 
generation American, poor, male and white.  Acker (2002) explains, to many upper 
middle class Anglo American Protestants this pattern of drug use reflected an alarming 
increase in vice which added to their anxieties about the profound social transformations 
resulting from industrialization, urbanization and new patterns of immigration. Perhaps it 
was not the drug itself that exacerbated the anxieties of the ruling class but what the drug 
represented: a changing cultural and social landscape that conflicted with American 
hegemonic control.  
 Early heroin users were also more socially visible than other opiate addicts of the 
time such as morphine users who enjoyed their drugs privately. Leahy (1915) explains 
morphine addicts were more of the intellectual type and secretive as to their habit and 
usually temperate in their dose and on the whole came from more diverse and better 
social backgrounds while heroin addicts represented the lumpenproletariat.  Pearce 
Bailey (1916) explains hygiene and grooming were frequently neglected by the heroin 
user and as a group they would have struck the public as worse than the “normal low” 
due to their often pale, emaciated and shabbily dressed appearance.  It may be misleading 
to describe early heroin uses as exclusively criminals and their gang affiliation was not 
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always pursuant to illegal activities.  Riis (1903) explains that a boy‟s affiliation with his 
gang and its activities was often casual something he did after school and the same group 
that might organize a baseball game or dance might also be found pilfering boxcars or 
smashing windows.  The gangs basic structure rewarded its most daring and pugilistic 
members making the boys all too eager to experiment and indulge in drugs such as heroin 
sniffing.  Pearce Bailey (1916) explains a common story of experimentation with heroin 
starts as: 
A group of boys being together at a group or show or some type of social gathering and 
one of the boys produces a package or ‘deck’ of heroin and tells the other boys taking it 
is wonderfully enjoyable and recommends the other boys try it. They of course want to 
follow the majority and go along and try the drug although the first taking is generally 
not agreeable, but they try it again and about twenty-five percent become victims of the 
habit within a few months (Bailey, 1916 p.314).                                               
  Many of these young men were labeled “junkies” and an examination of the 
etymology of the word reveals that in the 1920s it was used to describe how many addicts 
supported themselves and their habit. Courtwright (1982) notes the word in the literal 
sense meant “junkman” because early addicts picked through industrial dumps 
scavenging for copper, lead, and iron which they collected in a wagon and later sold to a 
scrap dealer.  Today, however, the word inspires some of the most negative connotations 
imaginable in which many conceptualize emaciated, ragged heroin addicts mainlining in 
a dark alleyway.  The transformation of the word “junkie” over the past century and its 
shift in meaning is largely the result of drug criminalization (Post Harrison Act) and the 
transgression of intragenic medical users to non-medical addicts that began to transpire in 
the early 1900s (Courtwright, 1982).   
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 The negative connotation attached to the word also represents the transition of 
early heroin sniffers to intravenous users and by the 1940s the heroin mainliner emerged 
as the dominant underworld addict type.  However, the switch to the needle can also be 
seen as a byproduct of the Harrison Act and other restrictive legislation that limited the 
legal supply of heroin forcing addicts to secure their drugs through the black-market.  As 
a means to increase profits peddlers would cut the drug with additives such as baking 
soda or laxatives, diminishing its potency and leaving users seeking a new method of 
ingestion that would increase the drug‟s euphoric effects (Courtwright, 1982).  By 1938, 
heroin on average was 27.5 percent pure; although that ratio is very potent compared to 
today‟s street heroin which is about 3-5% pure, it was considered highly adulterated by 
early users who were accustomed to purer drugs. O‟Donnell and Jones (1970) explain the 
intravenous technique likely began accidently when the addict hit a vein and after his 
initial fright wore off discovered that this method was even more euphoric than 
intramuscular injection.   
 What is also interesting about early heroin users is they were more likely to be 
institutionalized as a result of their drug use more so than other addicts of the time. Data 
from the U.S. Treasury Department‟s report “Traffic in Narcotic Drugs” (1919) reveals 
that early heroin addicts were more likely to be incarcerated or sent to public institutions 
while morphine addicts were more numerous in private hospitals and sanatoriums.  Even 
one hundred years ago we can see dramatic distinctions in how heroin addiction was 
approached when compared to other drug users.  The U.S. Treasury Department 
estimated that between 1915 and 1916, there were at least 10,000 heroin addicts 
institutionalized in either jails or prisons.  However, at that same time there were less 
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than 1,300 heroin addicts in private or public hospitals while there were over 4,000 
morphine addicts seeking treatment in hospitals and almshouses.  Also, in 1928 of the 
623 convicted addicts found suitable for custodial treatment at New York City‟s 
Correctional Hospital, 588 (98%) used heroin alone or in combination with other drugs. 
Courtwright (1982) notes that heroin addicts were (and still are) behind bars more so than 
other opiate addicts due to several reasons: many resort to stealing or dealing drugs to 
fund their habit, or because they are reared in the slums and most addicts are single males 
in their teens and twenties the prime time for crime with or without drugs.  However, 
Acker (2002) explains that drug criminalization efforts stemming from the Progressive 
Era sought to manage poor and working class urban populations.   
CRIMINALIZATION AND THE ORGINS OF NON-MEDICAL HEROIN 
ADDICTION 
 The early origins of non-medical heroin use in the U.S. can be attributed to 
several factors. One of the most significant contributions was the Opium Exclusion Act 
of 1882 and later the federal ban on smoking opium in 1905. Pearce Baily (1916) notes 
veteran smokers and recruits deterred by the ban abandoned the pipe and exchanged it for 
more powerful and then legal drugs such as heroin. Opium smoking in the U.S. began 
roughly around 1850 and was transplanted to the west coast by Chinese immigrants, but 
by the 1880s the trend was popular among whites alike (Courtwright, 1982). The drug 
was preferred among prostitutes, gamblers, and other criminals of the underworld but not 
exclusively. The white upper class routinely smoked opium at parties and social 
gatherings and it became established as the opiate par excellence. Unlike most other 
drugs, which were largely done privately or within small groups, opium smoking was a 
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social act due in part to the complexity of the pipe.  As a result opium dens became an 
integral part of the user subculture.  Kane (1891) noted that an individual‟s status was 
determined by his adherence to such groups and by his skills in performing the opium 
smoking ritual.   
 By the 1870s, the public‟s fear of opium smoking was heightened because the 
practice had spread beyond the Chinese on the West Coast and had become a favored 
opiate among white society folks many of which were women. Frederic Poole, a 
Philadelphia missionary, notes that white women were being seduced in the dens where 
shameless smokers persuaded “innocent girls” to smoke in order to excite their passion 
and sexual desire (Courtwright, 1982).  The Chinese received the wrath of responsibility 
for the opium smoking trade and although they controlled a considerable share of the 
U.S. market they were not alone in this endeavor.  Unfortunately, the entire Chinese 
community was held accountable for the opium trade and the public‟s fear of a Chinese 
dominated labor market served as a catalyst that prompted policy makers to act.      
  By 1875, public outrage directed toward the practice of smoking opium was 
translated into drug criminalization first in the form of municipal and state governments 
and later at the federal level. These fears were further sensationalized by the press and the 
San Francisco chronicle reported that in 1886 15,000 of the 30,000 Chinese living in the 
city were addicted to smoking opium (Courtwright, 1982). A San Francisco police officer 
even testified at a local hearing that ninety-nine out of one-hundred Chinese in the city 
were habituates of the pipe. These numbers were considered exaggerations by some 
historians who claim that only one out of twenty Chinese living in the city smoked opium 
(Courtwright, 1982). Accuracy aside, these misleading statistics were influential in the 
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first efforts aimed at drug criminalization in the U.S. San Francisco and Virginia were 
among the first cities to pass ordinances that penalized those caught possessing or 
smoking opium and these efforts were largely targeted at disassembling the public opium 
dens.  
 By 1915, 26 states had some type of anti-opium laws that sought to close public 
dens or ban the practice outright. Courtwright (1982) notes, that the state and local 
criminalization efforts were largely ineffective do to the laws‟ inconsistencies and 
selective police enforcement efforts. For example, the Chinese dens were targeted more 
aggressively while white opium smokers took the practice underground. Ultimately, there 
were two significant forces responsible for the decline of opium smoking in the U.S: 
demographics and federal legislation such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 which 
sought to prohibit the immigration of Chinese into the United States.  Courtwight (1982) 
explains that immigration restrictions and racial antagonisms took their toll, rapidly 
decreasing the number of Chinese in America from 103,620 in 1890 to 53,891 in 1920.                                                      
 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 remains one the most racially restrictive 
immigration laws in U.S. history and was a result of deep seated prejudices and the fear 
of a Chinese dominated labor market (Lee, 2002).  It is also important to note the 
significant impact this piece of legislation inadvertently played on opiate user trends 
because the Chinese controlled a considerable share of the opium trade in the United 
States,  and as their population dwindled so did the access to smoking opium.  As the 
supply of smoking opium diminished users were left with but a few choices: either stop 
using opiates completely or switch to a more legal and readily available substitute.  There 
were a very small handful of users that continued smoking opium regardless of its 
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growing scarcity and expensive price tag but many lacked the privilege of wealth needed 
to facilitate their habit.  Eventually, even this class of user faced the stark reality that the 
stock of smoking opium had practically evaporated.  This incited many users to simply 
switch to legal opiates that were readily available and significantly cheaper. Some 
switched to morphine, but many sought out heroin as a substitute and as a result the 
number of addicts consistently grew until the outbreak of WWII.  Although the opium 
importation ban and the Chinese Exclusion Act both contributed to the growing influx of 
heroin users there were other factors at play especially the growing scarcity of cocaine 
which also left its users looking for a suitable alternative.                                               
 Much like opium, cocaine was an early target of drug criminalization efforts and 
as a result its availability decreased leaving many users seeking out opiates such as heroin 
in exchange.  The alkaloid cocaine was isolated in the 1850s and it was used as a 
therapeutic and pain relief agent beginning in the 1880s.  Cocaine much like morphine 
received early glowing recommendations from the medical community and was 
prescribed for a variety of mild to moderate illnesses (JAMA,1900). Patent medical 
vendors peddled cocaine-laced tonics and self-treatment was partially to blame for the 
spread of addiction.  Public outrage toward the drug began to fester as sensationalized 
stories of cocaine-intoxicated African Americans filled local newspapers. Charles Terry 
(1920) notes that in Jacksonville, FL Blacks were overrepresented among regular cocaine 
users as many began to use the drug as a stimulant to increase work productivity.  But 
when we consider the working and social conditions of Black individuals living in the 
Jim Crow South it is not surprising that they sought a stimulant such as cocaine as an 
escape to the harsh realities of life. Especially when we consider that at this point the 
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drug was legal and peddled in tonics, elixirs and nostrums that were widely available to 
all.  
 According to Courtwright (1982) racially charged fears of Black men erratic and 
violent on cocaine fueled the public‟s fears promoting policy makers to impose criminal 
legislation on the drug. A South Carolina paper reported that the cocaine habit among 
Blacks has grown to be a great evil in many southern cities and the African American 
who takes cocaine becomes temporarily crazed and there is no crime which he will not 
commit (The Herald and News, 1909). The story also proclaimed that policemen fear the 
manic strength and fury of the cocaine intoxicated African American.  The Herald and 
News (1909) also reported that in Charlotte there are houses where cocaine fiends hold 
orgies and these places are filled with crazed demons. Even the New York Times 
reported on the false hysteria reporting that most of the attacks upon white women in the 
South were a result of the "cocaine crazed Negro brain" (Williams, 1914). These stories 
even prompted police officers to adopt the .38 caliber revolver because Black men high 
on cocaine could not be stopped by the standard .32 caliber (African American News, 
2007).  These sensationalized racial fears would be a reoccurring theme in efforts to 
criminalize drugs continuing throughout the 20th and 21st century.  The so called inner 
city crack epidemic is a modern example of these efforts of social control targeting 
marginalized groups.  
 Cocaine use was by no means exclusive to Blacks, the drug was also a popular 
stimulant among the white underworld in both southern and northern cities.  Much like 
the Chinese opium smokers in California, Blacks in the south were singled out as the 
most problematic users as a result of racial prejudices making restrictive legislation easier 
21 
 
to achieve (Courtwright, 1982).  Perhaps the South‟s reliance on slave labor and later the 
sharecrop system bares some responsibility for cocaine usage among African Americans 
during this period. By 1915, most states had passed laws designed to restrict the use of 
cocaine to therapeutic purposes and users were required to obtain legitimate prescriptions 
through physicians (Musto, 2002).  Also, the advent of tropacocaine, novocaine and 
stovaine retained the anesthetic properties of cocaine but lacked its euphoric effects 
giving physicians and dentists an alternative to prescribe in place of cocaine (JAMA, 
1906).  Restrictive legislation diminished the supply and inflated the prices of cocaine by 
1915 inciting many users to switch to a more accessible and then legal alternative such as 
heroin. 
DRUG CRIMINALIZATION: THE EARLY YEARS 
 Acker (2002) explains that drug criminalization efforts stemming from the 
Progressive Era sought to manage the poor and working class urban populations.   Heroin 
and cocaine addicts were among the most targeted user type because they represented a 
symbol of irredeemable deviance (Acker, 2002).  Public sentiments for the heroin addict 
were profoundly different than compared to morphine addicts who were typically seen as 
the "object of pity" because they were usually middle class white women or civil war 
veterans. Acker (2002) explains that this sympathetic attitude was not extended to the 
heroin addict who chose to reject mainstream societies expectations of him. The female 
morphine addict obtained inexpensive opiates at little social cost; yet the urban laborer 
heroin addict was forced to secure opiates that were increasingly costly in both financial 
and social terms. Moreover, at the macro level the early public policy efforts aimed at 
drug criminalization shaped the urban social milieu in which the heroin trade was 
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concentrated and how heroin addiction would be culturally defined throughout the rest of 
the 20th century (Acker, 2002). The progressive era policies that criminalized heroin 
were easy to sale to the mainstream public largely because the dominant user type was 
portrayed as a deviant urban male.   
 The press was also complicit in promoting the agendas of prohibitionist reformers 
by sensationalizing reports of heroin and cocaine fueled crime committed by the lower 
classes. Police also exaggerated the heroin problem and one New York City officer told 
reporters that the drug was a "courage builder" for the deviant (New York Sun, 1919). 
The article also reported that police statistics demonstrate that to every murder committed 
by an alcoholic, there have been four perpetrated by a dope fiend.  According to 
Courtwright (1982) much of what we think about opiate addiction in the United States is 
dependent upon who is addicted. Early newspaper accounts of heroin addiction support 
this assertion and illustrate the responses of law enforcement often times varied largely 
based on the socioeconomic characteristics of users.  The addicted poor were demonized 
as violent uncontrollable dope fiends who would stop at nothing until they got their 
drugs.  However, archival newspaper accounts reflect a different narrative was presented 
when the middle and upper classes fell victim to the plight of heroin addiction. 
 The New York Tribune (1921) featured a piece about a debutante who became 
addicted to heroin after a friend gave it to her for a headache. The debutante who stole 
her father‟s car and ran away from home was placed into police custody and confided in 
the officer she was a slave to the drug and it controlled her life. Although the officer 
found heroin in her possession she was not arrested. Compassionate to her plight, likely a 
result of her skin color and social standing, the officer even refused to tell her name to the 
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reporter of the cited article. He also said that he made sure she was taken to a place where 
she could get the proper treatment for her heroin habit (New York Tribune, 1921). The 
Evening Public Ledger (1915) reported a story about an 18 year old girl who was found 
unconscious from an overdose of cocaine or heroin during a police raid of known dope 
fiend‟s residence. Unlike the earlier story of the heroin addicted debutante whose name 
the officer would not reveal, nor would he arrest, the officer in this case had no 
reservations about either. Although the woman had been a victim of a drug overdose and 
almost died, the police had little sympathy as to her situation.  After her recovery she was 
sentenced to three months to the women‟s house of corrections in Philadelphia (Evening 
Public Ledger, 1915). The juxtaposition of these accounts illustrates the skewed 
responses of police based on the socioeconomic characteristics of the user. 
PREVALENCE OF OPIATE ADDICTION PRIOR TO WWII 
 It is hard to provide an exact number of non-medical heroin addicts in the U.S. for 
several reasons.  Records on addiction at the time were not thoroughly kept and in many 
instances early statistics were fabricated to influence public policy on narcotics use.  
Historians such as Musto, (1973) and Terry and Pellens (1928) argue that by 1924 there 
were around 100,000 to 200,000 opiate addicts (morphine, opium, and heroin) but they 
explain even that number must be taken with caution due to the questionable 
methodology many early studies used to gather data.  One example is Andrew DuMez‟s 
(1918) “Some Facts Concerning Drug Addiction” that concluded 750,000 as a 
conservative number of opiate addicts in the U.S.  Also, the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
estimated that there were 1, 500,000 opiate addicts as of 1919.   
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 Many scholars have rejected these estimates and argue that the prevalence of 
addiction was grossly misrepresented to influence prohibitionist narcotic policy (Terry, 
1920).  Courtwright (1982) also rejects the official estimates cited by both the Treasury 
Department and DuMez explaining much of the data gathered in both studies was 
fabricated.  His analysis of U.S. opium import statistics reveal that the Pre-WWII addict 
population reached its climax from 1900-1914 with 313,000 addicts and afterwards it 
began to steadily decline until the late 1940s.  Hamilton Wright, a Physician and scientist 
in addition to a U.S. Senator and the first Opium Commissioner was disingenuous with 
his estimates of opiate abuse and did so through manipulating the per capita opium 
imports to create an artificially constructed number to use as scare tactic to prompt 
narcotic reform policy (Courtwright, 1982).  Moreover, some historians suggest that the 
peak opiate usage in the U.S. climaxed in 1890 with an estimated 4.59 addicts out of 
every 1,000 individuals but afterward that number began a sustained decline.  In fact, 
opiate and cocaine  consumption and related problems had already began to decline on its 
own prior to the Harrison Act and the law merely signified already ongoing changes in 
social attitudes regarding drug use. Politicians of the time used racial fears, fabricated 
statistics and disingenuous arguments to support criminalization efforts.   
 The methodological flaws of these studies will be addressed in subsequent 
sections, however, accuracy aside both DuMez and Wrights official estimates on opiate 
addiction had a tremendous impact on the trajectory of narcotics criminalization because 
they were cited as evidence by reformers advocating for the Harrison Act and later 
presented as facts in the Webb and Doremus Supreme Court decisions. This presents a 
very important question; if our nation‟s most influential early narcotics policies were 
25 
 
based upon exaggerated and distorted evidence then might it be surprising that those 
reform efforts have been largely ineffective?  Courtwright (1982) explains that, overall 
narcotic use was steadily declining on its own prior to the Harrison Act but that soon 
changed and within a few decades of its enactment usage rates for heroin addiction far 
exceeded that of when the drug maintained a legal status.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
AN EXAMINATION OF NARCOTIC MAINTENANCE AND THE POLITICAL-
LEGAL FRAMEWORK USED TO DISMANTLE THE CLINIC SYSTEM 
  
 In some regards the Harrison Act was a classic piece of progressive legislation 
that attempted to regulate and restrict the sale of narcotic substances and reduce the 
number of addicts in America. Initially, the law was no more than a regulation that taxed 
the production, importation, and distribution of narcotics such as morphine, heroin, and 
cocaine. Many mark the law as the first efforts to criminalize drug users but in its infancy 
it was merely a tax regulation. Brecher (1972) explains how the law specifically provided 
that manufacturers, pharmacists, importers, and physicians prescribing narcotics maintain 
a license and pay a moderate fee.  Also, initially patent manufactures were exempted 
from these provisions and were not required to pay a tax on products containing opiate 
and cocaine derivatives.  Section II of the Harrison Act (1914) explains, it is unlawful for 
any persons to sell, barter, exchange or give away the aforesaid drugs (heroin, opium, 
morphine, and cocaine) except in pursuance of a written order.  The law also required 
physicians, dentist, and pharmacist to keep records on the dispensation and distribution of 
narcotic drugs including patient name and address.  Yet, from 1919-1935 more than 
25,000 physicians were arrested under the Harrison Act 2,500 of which were sentenced to 
prison (White, 2002).                                                                                                              
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 In all actuality, the Harrison Act simply required physicians, pharmacists, 
manufactures, and distributors to provide a tax stamp for narcotics and keep 
comprehensive records of the amounts of drugs they prescribed.  Ideally, if a physician 
was registered, presented his tax stamp and kept carefully patient records then he was 
inside the bounds of the law (Musto, 1973).  In its infancy, the Harrison Act did not 
appear to be a “prohibition law” but the right of a physician to prescribe narcotics proved 
indeed problematic because it was spelled out in such ambiguous language. What the law 
did not clarify was if physicians could provide maintenance to addicts although many law 
enforcement officials interpreted it to mean they could not.  Even in the initial months 
following the law‟s enactment revenue agents began harassing and arresting physicians 
and druggists who provided narcotics to addicts although many provided the appropriate 
tax stamp required by the law (Musto, 1973).  The legality of a physician‟s right to 
provide maintenance as a type of medical treatment under the Harrison Act was brought 
forth in two Supreme Court cases, Webb v. United States and United States v. Doremus. 
Consequently, a law that was initially created to ensure the market regulation of narcotics 
was transformed into a law that redefined a physician‟s autonomy to provide maintenance 
to addicts.   
UNITED STATES V. WEBB  
 The Webb decision was handed down on March 3, 1919 and held that a practicing 
physician could not issue morphine or heroin to a habitual user in the course of 
professional treatment for the purpose of keeping him or her comfortable by maintaining 
their customary use. Webb, a practicing physician, and Goldbaum a retail pharmacist in 
the Memphis area, were accused of customarily prescribing patient‟s morphine and 
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heroin for the sole purpose of maintaining their addiction.  According to Section I of the 
Harrison Act (1914) Webb and Goldbaum were not in violation of the law and had 
registered and paid the tax required of them. But it was the question of maintenance that 
was brought before the court.  Justice Day delivered the opinion and concluded 
physicians could not provide users opiates with the sole purpose of keeping them 
comfortable by maintaining their customary use (Webb et al. v. U.S., 249 U.S. 96).   It is 
important to note that the courts cited Hamilton Wright‟s “Report on the International 
Opium Commission” and Andrew DuMez‟s “Some Facts Concerning Drugs” both of 
which grossly overrepresented the prevalence of drug abuse and cited that there were at 
least 750,000 if not 1,500,000 addicts in the U.S.  The margin in this case was one vote, 
which presents an important question; if the Court could have seen a more statistically 
accurate picture of addiction and not a fabricated account inspired by political agendas, 
would it have affected their decision in favor of maintenance?   
       The Treasury Department wasted no time in enforcing the decision that provided 
them legal precedent to arrest and prosecute physicians and druggist providing users with 
maintenance care. According to Musto (1973) by April 1919, less than a month after the 
Webb decision was handed down Narcotics Agents arrested several prominent New York 
City druggists and physicians who had been supplying hundreds of users with morphine 
and heroin as a show of their commitment to enforcement efforts.  Musto (1973) notes 
that these medical providers had been under the careful eye of the Treasury Department 
for months but both the Webb and Doremus decisions gave them a legal basis to 
successfully prosecute physicians who provided maintenance to addicts. The Doremus 
case is of special importance here for several reasons. First, it upheld the constitutionality 
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of the Harrison Act and extended its scope beyond a simple tax measure. Secondly, it 
redefined the physician and patient relationship.    
UNITED STATES V. DOREMUS 
 The indictment against Dr. Doremus accused him of unlawfully and fraudulently 
prescribing heroin to a patient for the sole purpose of gratifying his appetite for the drugs.  
Doremus maintained the proper registration and tax stamp required by the law but the 
question brought forth by the court was if maintenance fell within the bounds of the 
“professional treatment of an illness or medical condition” (United States v. Doremus, 
249 U.S., 86). The lower court held the restrictions on Dr. Doremus's practice were 
irrelevant to the collection of revenue powers of the Harrison Act and it overreached the 
constitutional powers of the federal government. However, the Supreme Court did not 
agree and reversed the lower Courts ruling by a one vote margin.   
 The first two counts of the indictment against Dr. Doremus claimed that he 
distributed a large quantity of heroin to Mr. Ameris (his patient) that was not in 
pursuance of a written order form issued by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue.  
The indictment also claimed that Doremus did unlawfully and knowingly prescribe five 
hundred one-sixth grain tablets of heroin not in the course of the regular professional 
treatment of any disease from which the patient was suffering (United States v. Doremus, 
249 U.S., 86).  Instead, the court held that Dr. Doremus knew the patient was popularly 
known as a 'dope fiend' and prescribed the drug for the sole purpose of gratifying his 
appetite as an habitual user. It also concluded the excessive amounts of heroin prescribed 
to the patient may have been sold to other users without paying the imposed tax required 
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by the Harrison Act (United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S., 86).  The Supreme Court 
explained in its decision that the Harrison Act was not unconstitutional and it may be 
assumed that the statute has a “moral end” as well as a revenue purpose if the legislation 
is within the taxing authority of congress and the majority of Justices agreed it was.  The 
ruling was a triumph for reformers and it confirmed the constitutionality of the Harrison 
Act tax while limiting the manner in which drugs could be prescribed by physicians. The 
Doremus decision ultimately redefined the patient-physician relationship by stipulating 
narcotics could only be prescribed in the course of professional practice of an illness or 
medical condition (excluding addiction) and only and through valid prescriptions (United 
States v. Doremus, 249 U.S., 86). 
 Once again DeMez‟s “Some Facts Concerning Drugs” and the Treasury 
Departments “Traffic in Narcotic Drugs” were cited in the Doremus decision although 
both studies provided a sensationalized portrait of opiate addiction.  With a five to four 
vote in favor of upholding the constitutionality of Harrison this presents a very important 
question. Had the court received a more reflective account of the prevalence of opiate 
abuse would the Justices have ruled differently?  Especially when the court the explained 
that it may be assumed that the statute has a moral end as well as a revenue purpose if the 
legislation is within the taxing authority of congress. This same moral inclination may 
have proved less imperative if the addict population was more accurately stated.  Instead, 
the court cited DuMez‟s “Some Facts Concerning Drugs” which reported there were at 
least 750,000 and perhaps 1,500,000 opiate addicts in the United States, however, 
Courtwright (1982) explains that there were never more than 313,000 opiate addicts in 
America prior to 1914.   
31 
 
 A closer look at DuMez‟s study reveals he may have used fabricated and 
inaccurate data gathered from physician and pharmacist surveys to arrive at his 
conclusions regarding the addict population (Courtwright, 1982).  DuMez relied on self-
reporting surveys that attempted to tabulate per-store averages of opiate sales that were 
then used to estimate the overall addict population.  This type of methodology is 
extremely problematic because the study makes no effort to differentiate between 
medical and non-medical users. When later pressed by skeptics to present his original 
surveys DuMez postponed the matter until his death.  Nonetheless, DuMez‟s study 
dramatically impacted the trajectory of narcotics reform and scholars later document how 
statistically inaccurate they were. Musto (1973) and Courtwright (1982) compared 
DuMez‟s original estimates from his self-report surveys of physicians and druggist to 
opium import statistics from the 1890s to the 1920s. DuMez confidently proclaimed there 
could be as many as 1.5 million opiate addicts, however, Musto (1973) claimed that 
number was more like 313,000. 
 The Treasury Department even estimated that there were over 1,000,000 addicts 
(though this estimate once again was based on the questionable conclusions of DuMez‟s 
and Wright‟s studies) and the abrupt drug restrictions resulting from the Webb and 
Doremus decision would likely lead to an increase of crime and possibly even the death 
of many addicts (Courtwright, 1982). The Treasury Department reasoned that as „dope 
doctors‟ and druggist were arrested and closed their operations some attempt on behalf of 
the government was needed to provide addicts with a temporary supply of drugs until 
they were cured of the habit (Musto, 1973).  The almost idealist reference to “the cure” is 
indicative of the naiveté and lack of medical understanding regarding the psychological 
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and physiological components of addiction.  Drug treatment was in its infancy at this 
point and the majority of both the medical and government establishments felt there was 
a “cure” to addiction, however, almost a century later it remains undiscovered.  Musto 
(1973) notes that the state recognized its responsibility for the addicts plight insomuch 
that they felt it was necessary to provide temporary relief in the form of narcotics clinics 
though they never intended to make them a permanent public health initiative.  
  The small window in which narcotics clinics existed is unknown to many. 
Nonetheless, their existence represents a brief period in U.S. history in which addiction 
was approached with tolerance although this tolerance was short lived and eventually 
replaced with moral condemnation and criminalization. Ironically, the clinics were 
formed at the behest of federal government although they were quickly dismantled by 
many of the same policy makers who only a few years prior supported a coordinated 
maintenance effort. Specifically, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue explained in 
his annual report of June 1919 that provisions must be made for the treatment and cure of 
addicts who are unable to obtain supplies of drugs necessary to prevent physical and 
mental suffering as this condition may become a menace of life and property (Annual 
Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1919). However, attitudes of tolerance 
and compassion expressed toward the addict by federal government were quickly 
reverted and we can find evidence of this shift by the following year. In 1920, the Annual 
Report submitted by the same Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Department marks 
a changing discourse toward the individual addict and it cited the newly formed Narcotics 
Bureau‟s pamphlet claiming the clinics perpetuated an evil habit in persons who could be 
readily cured of their addiction (Musto, 1973).  An attitude of moral condemnation 
33 
 
replaced the matter of fact sympathetic statement cited by the Commissioner only a year 
prior largely as a result of the very public failure of the Worth Street Clinic. But, a close 
examination of the narcotics clinics reveals that in fact many provided effective 
maintenance care for addicts although the failure of one clinic specifically, the Worth 
Street clinic in New York City overshadow the marked success of others such as the 
Shreveport, Atlanta and Jacksonville facilities.   
NARCOTICS CLINICS 
  As early as 1914, narcotics clinics were being organized as a response to opiate 
addiction although the majority of the some 44 facilities were created in 1919 after the 
Webb and Doremous decisions redefined a private physicians right to prescribe narcotics 
for the sole purpose of maintenance( Courtwright, 1982).  The clinics sought to diminish 
the black-market supply and steer addicts away from private physicians and apothecaries 
who commercialized their vice. The basic philosophy behind the clinics was if enough 
addicts were supplied legally and at low cost then the individual would be relived from 
depending on  black market peddlers and would thus have more time to devote to 
legitimate pursuits such as securing employment, marriage, and family (Musto, 1973).  It 
was also agreed that some addicts were “curable” and not suited for maintenance care. 
Abstinence based rehabilitation programs were offered to many users through either the 
narcotics clinics or at local hospitals.  It was presumed that if enough addicts were 
supplied legally then the black market would diminish thus reducing the crime and harm 
that flowed from the illicit drug trade.  The clinics also sought to reduce the overall 
number of users because if chronic addicts were supplied legitimately then they would be 
less likely to recruits new users into the habit.   
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 The poor and working class were the chief clients of the clinics as those who 
preferred not to publicize their addiction and were more financially well to do could 
obtain their drugs from private physicians.  Morphine addicts were more successful in 
securing their supply from private physician‟s especially middle class women and older 
more sympathetic patients.  According to Musto (1973) many of the narcotics clinics 
were an extension of health department clinics used to treat tuberculosis, mental illness, 
and syphilis, while others focused solely on treating addicts.  The majority of facilities 
served small numbers of addicts, but New York City‟s Worth Street Clinic was by far the 
largest serving approximately 7,500 users (New York State Department of Health, 1920).  
The Table 1 below displays some of the more notable operations although there were 44 
documented clinics in the U.S. as of 1924.   
Table 1. Narcotic Clinics in the U.S. Between 1915-1924 
Clinic Location Overall Population Number of Patients 
Los Angeles, CA 576,673 481 
Hartford, CT 138,036 105 
Atlanta, GA 200,616 515 
Paducah, KY 24,735 35 
New Orleans, LA 387,219 250 
Albany, NY 113,344 120 
Rochester, NY 295,750 160 
Durham, NC 21,719 36 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 Youngstown, OH 132,358 65 
Providence, RI 237,595 175 
Memphis, TN 161,351 325 
Houston, TX 138,276 122 
Clarksburg, WV 27,869 49 
 
Source: Knob, L. and Dumez, A.G. (1924). The Prevalence and Trend of Drug Addiction 
 in the United States and Factors Influencing It. Public Health Reports, 39, 1182. 
  WORTH STREET CLINC                         
 Historians such as Terry and Pellens (1928) explains that, on the whole the clinics 
did a remarkably good job containing the spread of opiate addiction except for the New 
York City clinic which was a woeful failure. But, it is important to note that the New 
York City clinic operated under a different premise than the others because it required 
patients to detox off either morphine or heroin completely and often times abruptly.  
Also, the Treasury Department was extremely hands on in the day to day operations of 
the Worth Street facility and was largely responsible for establishing it as a detox 
program.  It was also the largest of all the clinics serving around 7,500 addicts whereas 
most facilities had an average of 50-75 patients (Musto,1973).  The Worth Street Clinic 
operated under the New York States Department of Narcotic Drug Control and was 
plagued by political and partisan patronage as it was the bone of connection between the 
addict population and state, city and federal officials. Dr. Dana Hubbard (1920) who 
worked at the Worth Street Clinic explains, some patients sold their excess narcotics to 
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other addicts, others recruited friends to register at the clinic to obtain additional drugs 
and as a whole the facility was poorly organized and ineffective.  
  Terry (1920) concluded that the New York City clinic‟s failure was due to its 
basic philosophy that regarded the individual addict as a criminal rather than a patient.  
Moreover, the clinic was plagued by long waiting times, its inability to deliver medical 
care, and lack of confidentiality that allowed addicts to be identified and harassed by law 
enforcement officials.  Because of the clinic‟s inefficiency and poor record keeping many 
patients received excess narcotics that were in turn sold on the black market to other 
addicts (Musto, 1973).  Opponents of the clinic system used the Worth Street Clinic as 
substantiated “proof” that maintenance was ineffective in curbing the illicit drug traffic or 
reducing the harms that resulted from the black-market trade.  Musto (1973) explains the 
New York City clinic was not a maintenance clinic, and its primary function was to give 
declining doses of opiates until the patient was completely detoxed, thus because it 
served as a detoxification program its failure cannot be used as an argument against 
maintenance or to discredit all the early narcotic clinics.  The Worth Street clinic 
officially closed its doors in 1920 due to mounting pressure from the New York 
Department of Health and the Treasury Department‟s newly formed Federal Narcotics 
Bureau, nonetheless, its failure was used as documented proof that maintenance was not 
practical and even dangerous (Musto, 1973).  Rather than examining more effective 
operations such as the Shreveport and Jacksonville facilities and restructuring the Worth 
Street Clinic to provide long term maintenance services and improving the organizations 
efficiency, it was easier to condemn maintenance as a public health initiative in exchange 
for abstinence based treatment models. 
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THE SHREVEPORT CLINIC  
 The Worth Street clinic indeed proved problematic for the maintenance argument 
and its failure overshadowed more efficient and effective operations such as the 
Shreveport, Jacksonville, and Memphis clinics.  Dr. Butler‟s Shreveport clinic is of 
particular interest because it was noted by historians as being by far one of the most 
efficient operations and it survived until 1923 after the majority of other facilities had 
closed their doors (Terry and Pellens, 1928; Courtwright 1982; Musto, 1973). The 
Shreveport clinic was one of two facilities that operated in Louisiana and were created at 
the behest of the state legislator who saw them as a legitimate and necessary response to 
opiate addiction.  The Louisiana clinics initially operated with the support of the State 
Board of Health which concluded that a permanent cure of those afflicted with drug 
addiction disease is impossible in the great majority of cases making maintenance a more 
plausible approach (Musto, 1973). The Shreveport clinic maintained the most important 
of the Louisiana operations and the overall success and longevity of the program should 
be attributed to Dr. Willis Butler.  
  Dr. Willis Butler ran the narcotics dispensary from 1918-1923 and initially 
maintained the support of the Treasury Department who commended his successful 
operation although their position reversed by 1923 due to mounting political pressure 
from the newly formed Federal  Narcotics Bureau of the Prohibition Department.  As of 
1920, the Shreveport clinic provided narcotics to 542 patients although Treasury officials 
were quick to accuse Dr. Butler of overprescribing morphine and heroin to habitués to 
secure a lucrative practice for himself.  However, Butler (1922) notes that only 211 of the 
clinics patients resided in Caddo Parish (where Shreveport is located) and the remaining 
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331 patients traveled from nearby localities in search of maintenance care as surrounding 
clinics closed their doors.  It is also worth mentioning Dr. Butler believed not all addicts 
were candidates for maintenance and felt it should be reserved as a last resort for the 
“incurables.” Butler explains he carefully evaluated each patient‟s medical background 
and user history prior to admittance to the clinic and in many cases recommended addicts 
be admitted to an inpatient detoxification program he operated at a nearby hospital 
(Butler, 1922).                                                            
  The Shreveport clinic and Dr. Butler survived multiple investigations led by Levi 
Nutt, then chief of the Narcotics Bureau of the Treasury Department who was an ardent 
opponent of the narcotics clinics and maintenance.  However, the investigations into Dr. 
Butler‟s clinic revealed a highly efficient operation where every grain of heroin and 
morphine was accounted for and his records were without error.  After visiting local 
pharmacist‟s narcotics investigators found that there was a dramatic reduction in narcotic 
prescriptions in the city of Shreveport and local arrest records showed a reduction in drug 
related crimes such as theft and property damage (Musto,1973).  
 The Shreveport clinic continued after many other maintenance facilities were 
forced to close their doors in large part due to a local city ordinance that provided a legal 
basis for its continued operation in spite of mounting pressure from the Federal 
government and Levi Nutt.  Moreover, the clinic outlived others as a result of the local 
political environment that included the cohesive support of law enforcement, city 
officials, and judges all of which felt maintenance was a necessary response to opiate 
addiction (Musto,1973).  For example, a Shreveport Federal Court Judge concluded he 
would vigorously oppose any steps taken toward discontinuance of the clinic because 
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from his experiences it had lessened crime in the city (Butler, 1922).  The Shreveport 
Police Chief cited that crime such as petty thievery and burglary had decreased since the 
inauguration of the clinic and he strongly recommended that it not be discontinued.   
 By early 1923, the Shreveport clinic finally closed its doors as the result of a third 
investigation launched by Levi Nutt that claimed the true reason for the clinics existence 
was to maintain a large payroll of clinic employees and Dr. Butler was purposely 
overprescribing narcotics to patients and was aware many were selling their excess on the 
black-market. Although the evidence used to substantiate such claims did not come in the 
form of clinics records or corroboration from local law enforcement in fact the local 
political establishment commended Dr. Butler‟s clinic and animatedly opposed it closing.  
Instead, the clinic was discredited by a single anonymous letter sent to Levi Nutt that 
accused Dr. Butler with overprescribing morphine and heroin and fueling the local illicit 
market. Dr. Butler concludes in a 1979 interview that the anonymous letter likely came 
from a small group of black-market peddlers who saw his clinic as competition 
(Courtwright, 1982).  Yet, there is an over-preponderance of proof in the form of the 
Treasury Department‟s  own previous investigations, local law enforcement arrest rates 
of addicts, and pharmacy and physicians records all of which substantiate Dr. Butler‟s 
clinic had a significant impact in reducing the harms of opiate addiction in the Shreveport 
area (Courtwright, 1982).                                                                                                                                        
THE DISMANTLING OF NARCOTICS CLINICS 
 Terry and Pellens (1928) conclude the Shreveport clinic remains the rallying point 
for those who believe a clinic system should have been established across the nation after 
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1919.  And had it not been for the adamant opposition of the newly formed Narcotics 
Bureau of the Treasury Department, headed by Levi Nutt, and John F. Kramer 
commissioner of the Prohibition Unit, the Shreveport, Jacksonville, and other well 
established operations could have become the nucleus of a national maintenance program 
(Musto,1973).  Mr. Nutt was especially opposed to the idea of maintenance and avowed 
to dismantle the clinic system and did so successfully by threating participating 
physicians with prosecution under the Webb and Doremus rulings which upheld the 
constitutionality of the Harrison Act.  Nutt also used the failure of the Worth Street Clinic 
and other poorly organized facilities to sensationalize the fear of maintenance and the 
societal harms it could impose.  
 By 1921, the federal government had officially changed its position on the 
narcotics clinics from tolerance to criminalization by using threats, intimidation and in 
many cases the prosecution of participating physicians and druggist (Musto,1973).  As a 
result, physicians who  operated maintenance clinics became reluctant and uncomfortable 
with prescribing opiates to addicts due to harassment from Revenue agents, the fear of a 
time consuming and costly trial, and moreover the very real threat of losing their licenses 
and being sent to prison. Musto (1973) explains the successful campaign to close the 
clinics is largely attributed to the establishment of a semiautonomous federal agency, the 
Narcotics Bureau, which mounted a coordinated attack using 170 agents to dismantle the 
clinics. The press was also quick to condemn the narcotic clinics and often praised the 
efforts of the Narcotic Bureau for closing them.  A Washington Times (1921) article 
categorized the narcotics clinics as a failure because the clinics encouraged rather than 
curbing the addiction of habitués. The article also applauded the efforts of narcotics 
41 
 
inspectors and agents who were successfully dismantling the clinics that were 
perpetuating addiction (Washington Times, 1921).  The failure of the Worth Street clinic 
was also cited as proof the clinic system should be abandoned. Ultimately, the Narcotics 
Bureau‟s relentless tactics of using threats and intimidation was successful and the all the 
clinics had closed by 1923.  
 Just as hastily as the clinics were developed they were also dismantled with little 
thought to the consequences for the addict population.  Rather than going back to the 
drawing board and reassessing the maintenance approach and striving to make the clinics 
more regulated and effective by focusing on more successful facilities such as the 
Shreveport and Jacksonville clinics, it was easier to condemn the entire system and 
exchange it for strictly abstinence based approaches.  In 1924, efforts to provide heroin 
maintenance were abandoned altogether due to the passage of the Heroin Act led by 
Pittsburg Republican Congressman Stephen Porter. The bill prohibited the manufacture, 
importation, and possession of heroin, although very small quantities were reserved for 
the advancement of scientific research (Musto, 1973).  The rationale behind the 
legislation was if lawmakers could act domestically in limiting the supply of heroin the 
international community would soon follow by also banning the manufacture of the drug 
thus diminishing its black-market availability and solving the countries heroin problem 
entirely.  However, in complex societies such simplistic approaches seldom work, and the 
1924 law offered no magic remedy to the nation‟s growing appetite for heroin and instead 
a thriving black-market replaced a once legal and regulated supply.  Although small 
numbers of physicians continued to privately prescribe morphine to addicts, the practice 
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had largely disappeared by the 1940s as older physicians who sympathized with the 
addict died off and were replaced by less empathetic practitioners (Brecher, 1972).  
 The relentless efforts of reformers, policy makers, along with both federal and 
state  law enforcement officials had little impact on diminishing the black market 
availability of heroin and instead the number of users consistently increased until the 
1940s and then again in the 1960s and consistently thereafter (Courtwright, 1982).  User 
trends also changed and the drug that was mainly sniffed or orally ingested was primarily 
being used intravenously by the mid- 1920s.  As policy makers and the medical 
community alike realized that the prohibition and criminalization of opiates, especially 
heroin, had little impact on diminishing black-market availability or reducing the addict 
population, the debate regarding maintenance reemerged as early as the 1950s.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RE-EVALUATING NARCOTIC MAINTENANCE 
 
 After the clinic system was dismantled there were few resources or effective 
treatment options for addicts until the 1960s.  For those who could afford they opted for 
detoxification treatment in private hospitals but for the majority of addicts this was 
simply not an option and most either suffered quietly from a jail cell or privately in their 
homes. The debate surrounding heroin maintenance lay dormant throughout much of the 
1930s and 1940s largely in part because the overall addict population was relatively small 
and at the time the nation was preoccupied with its newly acquired economic prosperity 
that stemmed from the war effort.  Penalties for those caught possessing heroin and 
cocaine were nonetheless punitive and in some cases those convicted of multiple offenses 
were given life sentences in prison.  Historian David Courtwright (1982) explains heroin 
addiction hit a record low during World War II and throughout the 1940s likely because 
trade routes for smugglers were disrupted and most Americans were enjoying the 
economic stability of the Post-War economy.  
 As the war came to a close, smuggling routes resumed and by the early 1950s the 
heroin problem reemerged.   According to Jones (1996) the second wave of heroin 
addiction became a staple of the hipster identity emerging first through the Harlem jazz 
44 
 
scene and then the Beatnik subculture. Supply routes were also changing and as a result 
of the French Connection an increased flow of heroin was smuggled into the U.S. most of 
which was controlled by organized crime families. Jones (1996) suggests that beginning 
in the 1920s Black northern jazz musicians developed a distinct “hipster” culture that 
embraced creativity, spontaneity, freedom and excitement.  This also included casual use 
of marijuana and heroin.  This group of individuals who were largely excluded from the 
traditional American dream created their own distinct subculture that thrived in cities 
such as Harlem and Chicago (Jones, 1996).  It is also important to note that heroin use in 
this context did not maintain the negative connotation that is synonymous with its use 
today.  Jones (1996) further explains for the first time heroin possessed a powerful 
articulated cultural meaning along with marijuana as an essential element of the hipster 
life. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics however did not agree and those caught possessing 
or sailing narcotics were subject to stiff penalties often in the form of long prison 
sentences.  
 Musto (2002) explains that the second wave of heroin use had a significantly 
strong impact on African-American and other ethnic minorities such as Puerto Ricans 
who had migrated to Chicago, New York, and D.C. during the Post-War years.  The 
changing user trends that included more and more young men of color produced a so 
called “less desirable addict type” and therefore sanctions and measures for control 
became increasingly punitive and aimed at incarceration.  According to Courtwright 
(1982) it would be inaccurate to simply attribute these changes in narcotic policy as 
simply a function of the changing addict population.  However, the hardline approach 
that began Post-Harrison Act would have been difficult to sale to the American public if 
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the dominant user type had still been ailing old ladies and crippled Civil War veterans as 
was the case in the early 1900s (Courtwright, 1982). 
 Anti-drug laws increased in severity beginning in the 1930s and continued well 
into the 1950s. Musto (1973) explains the peak of drug intoleration reached a climax in 
1956 when the death penalty was applied in a case where narcotics had been sold to 
minors. These draconian and inhumane responses to drug use were legitimized through 
the Boggs Act of 1952, and the Narcotic Control Act of 1956. These measures enacted 
mandatory sentencing for the possession and sale of narcotics and allowed life sentences 
to be imposed for those convicted of multiple violations (Musto, 1973). The Narcotics 
Control Act, supported by the FBN, prompted the most stringent drug penalties to date by 
introducing the death penalty for certain drug offenses (Cameron and Dillinger, 2011).  
However, even before the Post-War heroin problem resurfaced addicts were already 
being disproportionately incarcerated.  By 1928, less than a decade after the passage of 
the Harrison Act and merely five years after the narcotic clinics closed their doors, more 
than two-thirds of federal inmates were identified as addicts prompting the congressional 
passage of the Porter Act in 1929 (White, 2002). Rather than reassessing the punitiveness 
of narcotics laws or providing drug treatment in a community setting as an alternative to 
incarceration, the Porter Act mandated the creation of two Federal Narcotics Farms 
which were operated under the U.S. Public Health Service.    
 The first Narcotics Farm was created in 1935 in Lexington, KY and the second in 
Fort Worth Texas in 1938, both of which sought to provide drug treatment for addicted 
prisoners and volunteers. The Farm in Lexington was an anomaly because it was the first 
Federal correctional facility that operated as both a hospital and prison. According to 
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Campbell, Olsen and Walden (2008) the Farm at Lexington became the country‟s 
epicenter for addiction treatment and research. It was also a gathering place for the 
country‟s growing drug subculture and for many a rite of passage that initiated famous 
heroin hipsters from the Jazz scene, street hustlers, and drug store cowboys into the 
emerging fraternal order of the American Junkie (Campbell, Olsen and Walden, 2008). In 
1974, the Narcotics Farm in Lexington operated as a psychiatric hospital until 1998 when 
it was established as a Federal Medical Center for offenders with medical and mental 
health illnesses.   
 Considering that drug treatment at this point was in its infancy, the Farms offered 
addicts one of the more effective treatment options available at the time.  There were 
indeed other treatment facilities such as psychiatric institutions, hospitals, and community 
care facilities although they practiced a range of experimental and barbaric treatment 
methods that inflicted substantially more harm than good.  For example, electric shock 
therapy, insulin shock therapy, hibernation therapy, morphine aversion (induced nausea) 
and the experimental use of lobotomy continued to be practiced on the addict populations 
well into the 1950s (Musto, 1973).  These treatment methods which were draconian in 
nature and like something out of an Alford Hitchcock movie ultimately prompted the 
Joint Committee of the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association 
to implore more effective and humane alternatives for the treatment of substance abuse.   
 The American Bar Association and American Medical Association Committees 
expressed outright opposition to the ultra-punitive Boggs Act and the Narcotic Control 
Act that imposed lengthy mandatory sentencing for first time drug offenders.  Under the 
Boggs Act, a first time offense involving the possession of cocaine, opiates, or even 
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marijuana would result in a two to five year mandatory prison sentence (Musto, 1973). 
For those convicted of a second offense, a five to ten year sentenced was handed down 
and those with a third offense were given ten to twenty years and in some cases life in 
prison. Also, the law mandated that after the second offense parole was not offered.  The 
ABA and AMA Committees recommended increasing both federal and state expenditures 
for treating substance abuse as an alternative to incarceration and the committee even 
entertained reexamining the feasibility of implementing narcotic maintenance trials 
(Breecher, 1972).  The ABA and AMA Committee Report marks a very interesting turn 
of discourse regarding addiction from the medical community and although it was short 
lived it does in fact mark a watershed moment in the policy debate regarding heroin 
maintenance in the U.S.   
THE ABA AND AMA JOINT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTIC DRUGS 
 The Joint Committee on Narcotic Drugs headed by the American Bar Association 
and the American Medical Association (1959) in its report expressed dissatisfaction with 
the existing narcotic laws and called for the medical rather than the punitive approach 
toward addiction.  The committee also indicated a positive yet cautious attitude toward 
the possibility of adopting British practices that allowed physicians the autonomy to 
prescribe heroin in cases of chronic addiction. The British System, as it is commonly 
referred to, defined heroin and morphine addiction as a manifestation of a morbid state 
and considered it an illness in which physicians could treat by providing addicts with 
legal supplies of narcotics (Breecher, 1972).  The British system was noted as a success 
in diminishing the black market supply of heroin by reducing the overall number of 
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addicts to 700 by 1935, and by 1951 it was reported there were only 301 heroin addicts in 
the United Kingdom (Breecher, 1972).   
 After the passage of the Harrison Act and the dismantling of the narcotics clinics 
physicians and policy makers visiting the UK were impressed with overall effectiveness 
of the British system and upon returning to the U.S. suggested a similar model be tried in 
the states (Breecher, 1972).  Moreover, many of the proposals recommended by the ABA 
and AMA joint committee derived from visits to Britain and observations of how they 
addressed addiction by allowing physicians the autonomy to decide when maintenance 
was appropriate.  According to Breecher (1972) the 1960s, the British System fell under 
stiff criticism as a small handful of physicians began prescribing the drug quite liberally 
leaving the government seriously reevaluating its approach regarding heroin maintenance 
and the autonomy it placed in the hands of doctors.   
 In 1955, the ABA and AMA joint committee launched a comprehensive study of 
narcotic addiction and the laws that prohibited its use. The committee‟s primary 
objectives were to create a more sociological and psychiatric-orientated analysis of 
addiction and it also sought to reduce the mandatory sentencing of narcotic addicts in 
exchange for treatment (Musto, 1973).  The Committee suggested, albeit subtlety, 
revisiting the idea of dispensing narcotics in an outpatient clinic environment. The 
Committee‟s Interim Report released in 1958 included two appendixes each of which 
maintained its somewhat distinct tone regarding its policy recommendations. The first 
appendix written by the Committee‟s chair expressed praise for the British System and 
also suggested that crime could be curtailed if addicts were provided their drugs.  
According to Musto (1973) the Committees report was notably progressive in its 
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recommendations but the Federal Bureau of Narcotics wasted no time in refuting its 
legitimacy by claiming the report was authored by a bunch of “crackpot” doctors and 
sociologists. The Bureau‟s official response came in the form of its own ad hoc advisory 
committee, entitled “Comments on Narcotic Drugs: Interim Report of the Joint 
Committee of the ABA and AMA” (1959) and it focused on the so called failures of the 
old narcotics clinics, most notable the Worth Street Clinic (Musto, 1973). The FBN‟s 
response illustrated Anslingers personal opposition for the old clinic system. The report 
focused solely on the negative aspects of the New York clinics omitting the more 
effective operations such as the Shreveport and Jacksonville facilities (Musto,1973).  
 The FBN maintained the position that the best “cure” for addiction remained 
drying up the supply of narcotics through law enforcement efforts.  Although the 
Committee had not directly recommended creating a narcotic dispensing clinic system, it 
did advocate for an experimental clinic which never materialized. Had the FBN engaged 
in a meaningful dialogue with the AMA and ABA aimed at a more medical 
understanding toward addiction the outcome may have been different. However, for the 
first time since the old clinics were dismantled the most prestigious institutions of law 
and medicine were seriously questioning the countries hardline drug policies.  
 According to Musto (1973) drug use in the 1950s began to symbolize the 
conflicting ideologies between two groups; a new emerging counterculture and the rest of 
society, therefore allowing drug toleration might disrupt social harmony and thus 
question the old order. There was also the belief that drug use threatened to disrupt the 
delicate American social structures (i.e. capital accumulation, wage labor and the class 
system) and this line of thinking consequently limited the move toward drug toleration 
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such as permitting physicians to prescribe narcotics for maintenance purposes. There 
would be other inquiries into the feasibility of narcotic maintenance and the 1962 White 
House Conference on Drug Use and Abuse marks another milestone in this policy debate.   
PRESIDENT KENNEDY‟S WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON NARCOTIC DRUG 
ABUSE 
 In his speech during the White House Conference on Narcotic Drug Abuse (1962) 
President Kennedy explained that for half of a century the nation has faced persistent 
vexatious problems arising from the abuse of narcotic drugs.  The president explained it 
was a terrible loss to society in the form of human suffering, misery and lost productivity 
in the form of wage labor and tax revenue that flowed directly from drug abuse.  
President Kennedy (1962) also noted that the current treatments available for addiction 
produced discouragingly high relapse rates which were cause for great concern (Office of 
the White House Press Secretary, 1962).  He also demanded that more effort needed to be 
directed toward the social causes of addiction rather than focusing solely on the 
symptoms.  He also urged that the problem of drug addiction be systematically explored 
by both sociologists and the medical community so that more humane and effective 
treatment modalities could be developed (Office of the White House Press Secretary, 
1962).   
 The Presidents Ad Hoc Panel of eight M.D.‟s and Ph.D.‟s rejected the accepted 
practice of long prison sentences for drug addicts and recommended parole and 
mandating community-based drug treatment instead. According to Breecher (1972) 
President Kennedy's White House Conference on Drug Use and Abuse stated that it 
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would welcome careful, rigorous and well monitored research that would identify if 
certain addicts who could not be permanently weaned from drugs could be maintained in 
a socially acceptable manner. The Panel was hesitant to publically support adopting the 
British Practices toward heroin maintenance or even an experimental clinic. Providing 
heroin addicts their drug of choice was not socially accepted but perhaps methadone, a 
powerful opiate synthetic, was not precluded from the conversation.   
 Methadone had been used at the Narcotics Farms since the late 1940s as a 
withdrawal aid and in the early 1960s medical trials revealed it could be used safely in an 
outpatient community setting (Dole and Nyswander, 1965). The opposition of Harry 
Anslinger against any type of maintenance therapy regardless if it was practiced in a 
socially acceptable manner curtailed momentum for the methadone argument 
temporarily. Courtwright (1982) explains that since prohibition minded policy had 
proved counterproductive it seemed logical to revert back to supplying addicts cheap 
legal drugs just as long as they were not the addict‟s drug of choice.  The idea was further 
legitimized by President Kennedy‟s welcome of research into the feasibility of providing 
ambulatory care for addicts. Also, the Supreme Court decision Robinson v. California 
provided additional momentum for the idea of maintenance treatment because it 
established that narcotic addiction was a disease and that addicts were the proper subjects 
for medical treatment (Musto, 1973). Anslinger would soon be resigning and in August 
of 1962 after 32 years he left the FBN leaving the political climate for change ripe.   
 The Ad Hoc Panel was not as welcoming toward heroin maintenance as the ABA 
and AMA Committee. But, it did signify a changing discourse and openness to new ideas 
that would later facilitate the establishment of methadone as an acceptable treatment 
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approach.  Although it is not exactly clear why Anslinger resigned Trebach (1982) 
explains it may have been a result of conflicting political agendas between the FBN and 
the progressive Kennedys administration.  Anslinger‟s approach consisted of campaigns 
aimed at negative drug imagery, stiff mandatory sentences, and the consensus of the 
nation‟s institutions of law and medicine against drug tolerance (Musto, 1973). No single 
official in the drug abuse field would ever match the fearsome power that Anslinger 
maintained for over three decades.  
 Consequently, after Anslinger left the FBN a trend toward developing humane 
approaches to addiction including methadone began to take form (Trebach, 1982). The 
Kennedy Administration blatantly threatened these old forms of control by publically 
welcoming a more humane and medical approach toward addiction. Anslingers grand exit 
combined with a new progressive thinking presidential administration meant the political 
climate was changing and the old ways of punishing addicts using mandatory sentences 
and stints at the Narcotic Farms was no longer socially acceptable (Trebach, 1982). 
Although the 1962 Ad Hoc Panel did not openly express support for heroin maintenance 
it did call for additional research to identify more effective methods of drug treatment.  
The President would revisit the issue once again in 1963 when he appointed a second 
Advisory Commission on Narcotic Drug Abuse. 
 On November 1, 1963 only weeks before the president‟s assassination the new 
Advisory Commission recommended that Federal regulations be amended to reflect the 
general principle that the medical treatment of a narcotic addict is to be determined by the 
medical profession (Trebach, 1982).  The president‟s recommendation if successfully 
enacted could have in fact reversed the old interpretation of the Harrison Act upheld by 
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the Webb and Doremus decisions, which redefined physician autonomy and banned 
narcotic maintenance. The second Advisory Commission also recommended a network of 
small community-based hospitals specializing in addiction treatment to reduce the 
number of individuals under restraint in state mental hospitals (Trebach, 1982).  The 
recommendations of the 1963 Commission could have been a game changer because the 
president planned to restore the autonomy back to the medical community so that 
addiction could be treated as a legitimate disease instead of a stigmatized social 
condition. This of course did not happen and his successor President Johnson ignored the 
Committee‟s and Kennedy‟s recommendations. The assassination of President Kennedy 
was not only a national tragedy but it also meant his progressive agenda that was 
uprooting old institutions of control such as the FBI, CIA, and FBN would be largely 
abandoned (Trebach, 1982).   
 In his tenure as President, Lyndon Johnson did fulfill one recommendation of 
Kennedy‟s 1963 Advisory Commission on Narcotic Drugs although it was three years 
later. The Narcotic Rehabilitation Act (NARA) of 1966 was the first concrete sign that a 
powerful political consensus had developed regarding the need for non-punitive 
approaches to addiction (Trebach, 1982).  Ideally, the law would create an alternative to 
incarceration for some first time federal drug offenders as long as there were non-violent 
offenders.  However, repeat offenders were excluded from the option for treatment and 
the program never served more than 1,723 individuals between 1968 and 1979. The 
debate regarding heroin maintenance during the Johnson administration was practically 
non-existent and would not resurface again until the mid-1970s. This was largely in part 
because methadone was seen as being a more practical and socially acceptable alternative 
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to heroin due to it promising ability to stabilize addicts while reducing their illicit drug 
use (Trebach, 1982).   Throughout much of the 1960s, the problem of drug addiction 
including heroin use was on the rise in all strata of society.  However, the problem 
disproportionately affected poor marginalized groups as well as inner city Black and 
Latino populations. Musto (1973) explains that the 1960s broke through the brittle shell 
of defense that rejected old perceptions of drug use that was laughable to the new 
emerging counterculture. There was also a growing prison system that would be 
overwhelmed by a small fraction of those who continued to break drug laws.  But there 
was a great hope that methadone would provide a partial solution to reducing crime and 
increasing productivity among heroin dependent persons who were thought to be 
responsible for a significant level of property crime. Methadone may have failed to live 
up to its early hype but it did establish for the first time since the old narcotics clinics 
were dismantled that maintenance using legal opiates was once again socially acceptable. 
THE COUNTERCULTURE AND THE SOCIAL UPHEAVAL OF THE 1960s 
 The 1960s was indeed an explosive time full of controversial wars, civil protests, 
and vibrant creativity of a generation who were encouraged to tune in turn on and drop 
out. According to Wesson (2011) the Vietnam War, institutionalized racism, and 
conflicting gender roles fueled social upheaval and political activism. Herwitt (2006) 
explains that the counterculture represented a major digression in mainstream American 
society as young people began to question the American way of life. This departure from 
traditional normative values also facilitated increased drug use.  Moynihan (2002) 
explains drug use among young people was a great cause for concern in the 1960s and it 
has increased to epidemic levels mutating as epidemics do.  Heroin addiction was 
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ravaging the slums, LSD plagued prep schools, and cocaine the drug of choice for the 
1970s was transgressing to crack (Moynihan, 2002).  Although heroin addiction was 
steadily increasing throughout the 1960s socially constructed crime myths created in 
nonscientific forums were used to sensationalize drug use (Kappeler and Potter, 2005). 
 According to Musto (1973) in 1971 over 24 million Americans reported using 
marijuana, and in 1975 five percent of all Americans reported using LSD. Heroin use had 
also witnessed significant growth although it is never easy to estimate this cohort of drug 
users. From 1960 the number of heroin users rose from about 50,000 to roughly half a 
million by 1970.  Intravenous heroin use was the dominate method of delivery resulting 
in an increased number of Hepatitis cases from 4,000 in 1966 to 36,000 in 1971 (Musto, 
1973).  The heroin sniffers of the old days were replaced by a group of largely poor 
marginalized users who demanded a more powerful method of delivery.  Consequently, 
the spread of intravenous drug use was also the product of diluted street heroin that was 
relatively low in potency as it was adulterated by traffickers and pushers who controlled 
the black-market supply (Courtwright, 1982). Cheap heroin flooded the streets of D.C, 
New York, Chicago, and Detroit as a result of increased smuggling activity through the 
French Connection and some even claim heroin was brought in through the U.S. 
military‟s very own cargo plans and freighters (McCoy, 1972).  
 The French Connection controlled by the Corsican Crime family, Paul Carbone 
and Francois Spirito, manufactured heroin from opium that was grown in Turkey and 
Indochina. The opium was transported to France where it was refined into heroin and was 
then transported to Canada where it was smuggled to its final destination: the thriving 
black-market of the United States (McCoy, 1972). Stories also surfaced that heroin was 
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being smuggled by U.S. soldiers on cargo planes coming back from Vietnam.  And some 
even suggest that the CIA contributed to the trafficking of heroin into the U.S. throughout 
the Vietnam War.  This theme was explored by Alford McCoy‟s (1972) book the Politics 
of Heroin which implicated that the CIA was complicit in aiding the Southeast Asian 
heroin trade. McCoy even testified in front of a congressional hearing that heroin was 
being transported and smuggled from Laos and Burma using Air America which was 
covertly owned and operated by the CIA. There were also widespread incidences of 
heroin abuse within the U.S. armed forces and in 1971 Army medical personnel 
estimated that approximately 10 to 15 percent of low ranking enlisted men in Vietnam 
used heroin (Breecher, 1972). The U.S. heroin trade was indeed fruitful during this period 
and the surge of users from 50,000 in 1966 to over half a million in 1971 is indicative 
that the drug had found an effective entry point into the country (Kuzmarov, 2009). 
Whether it be through the French Connection, or CIA controlled air carriers is up for 
interpretation. What is evident is that there was a growing heroin epidemic in Americans 
urban centers and President Nixon promised to balance law enforcement efforts with 
access to effective drug treatment which matriculated to the War on Drugs along with a 
growing reliance on methadone clinics. 
NIXON AND THE DRUG WAR 
 It was not until 1964 that methadone was used for maintenance therapy by Dr. 
Vincent Dole and Marie Nyswander from Rockefeller University.  According to Dole and 
Nyswander (1965) when studying the effects of methadone the physicians witnessed 
dramatic improvements in their patients as they began to move about making their beds 
and asking when they could go back to work.  By the late 1960s the use of methadone 
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began to spread far beyond the experimental stages and a number of outpatient clinics 
were being developed in New York City, Chicago and D.C. According to Trebach (1982) 
an executive briefing was provided to President Nixon about methadone‟s effectiveness 
in reducing heroin use, and drug related crime. But, the memo also warned that the drug 
could be morally and socially controversial because it allowed users to continue taking 
the drugs as long as they needed. Musto (1973) explains methadone not only provided a 
more humane solution to dangerous drug use but it was also a big step toward sanctioning 
the most extreme anti-enforcement style, the provision of providing heroin itself to heroin 
addicts.  
 President Nixon was less concerned with the therapeutic effectiveness of 
methadone but saw it as a useful tool in combating the “War on Drugs” and a way to gain 
political capital for potentially reducing the crime rate (Treabach, 1982).  Although 
Nixon accepted the use of methadone as a suitable treatment alternative for heroin 
addiction other elements of his administrations drug policies were not as progressive.  His 
infamous declaration of the War on Drugs in 1971 called for an increase presence of state 
control control agents, an acceptance of no knock warrants, and the revival of mandatory 
sentencing in hopes of squashing the nation‟s growing drug problem (Treabach, 1982). 
Nixon was also responsible for re-categorizing marijuana as a scheduled one drug which 
implicated its abuse potential was the equivalent of heroin.  Trebach (1982) explains that 
the laws and regulations created during Nixon‟s presidency on the one hand increased the 
scope and power of criminal sanctions involving drug use, but at the same time it also 
increased funding expenditures for treatment.  
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 Much of this was achieved through the comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act of 1970. This was in fact the most far reaching single piece of drug 
legislation since the Harrison Act as it sought to codify the numerous federal narcotics 
laws and amendments that had been passed since the Opium Ban of 1887 (Trebach, 
1982).  The criminal provisions of the encompassing law covering drug possession, sales, 
and trafficking was infinitively complex because it possessed both repressive and liberal 
features (Trebach, 1982).  For example, mandatory minimums for first time drug 
offenders had been largely abandoned in exchange for probation and court ordered 
treatment.  However, the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act maintained vague and 
ambiguously worded provisions regarding asset forfeitures, fines, and long sentences. In 
fact, the law allowed life sentences to be imposed for those convicted of multiple 
offenses or if one was determined by the courts to be a “dangerous special drug 
offender.” However, there was a softer albeit less publicized side to the Nixon 
administration‟s drug policy that maintained a distinct progressive and even liberal tone 
(Treabach, 1982).  Behind Nixon‟s public declarations to fearlessly combat drug use and 
crime he appointed a group of liberal, predominately Democratic drug abuse experts, to 
consider the utility of a medical model of drug policy (Treabach, 1982). 
METHADONE MAINTENANCE 
 Ironically, the same day President Nixon declared the War on Drugs he also 
created the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, commonly known as 
SAODAP. According to Treabach (1982) SAODAP was in many ways a promising 
public policy that was headed by some of the nation‟s foremost experts in the field of 
addiction treatment. Jerome Jaffe, a psychiatrist and the first director of SAODAP along 
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with Robert DuPont and others were given the task to pioneer more humane treatment 
options for addicted persons.  SAODAP‟s main objectives were: coordinating all the drug 
abuse activities of the entire Federal bureaucracy to reduce overlap; expand treatment for 
heroin addicts, oversee and coordinate the intervention of addicts coming back from 
Vietnam; create science based research that would  gain a better understand of the disease 
of addiction to name a few (Treabach, 1982). SAODAP was also a strong proponent of 
methadone maintenance and was instrumental in establishing a network of clinics in 
urban cities across the United States. 
 Prior to being named the head of the SAODAP, Jerome Jaffe actually piloted a 
methadone program in Chicago and argued the best solution to the heroin problem was 
increasing access to methadone clinics (Kleber, 2002).  By 1973, there were an estimated 
400 methadone clinics throughout the United State and historian Herbert Kleber (2002) 
coined the 1970s the Golden era of methadone.  Surprisingly, a country who only fifty 
years ago rejected the idea of maintenance under the pretext that maintaining an addict 
simply for the sake of satisfying his appetite for narcotics and keeping him comfortable 
was now embracing the idea of narcotic maintenance as long as it was methadone. Musto 
(1973) explains that methadone maintenance during the Nixon Administration illustrates 
a great compromise between simple toleration of drug use and the public‟s demand that 
heroin related crime be curbed. Addicts received something to assuage their drug craving 
just not their drug of choice.  Nonetheless, hopes were high during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s that methadone could offer a solution to the countries highly sensationalized 
heroin problem.   
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 Overall, methadone is an effective withdraw aid and maintenance tool and about 
34% of patients who leave treatment on their own terms remain sober (Joseph, Stancliff 
and Langrod, 2000). Compared to strictly abstinence based programs that have more or 
less a 10% success rate, methadone is the more effective choice especially among 
intravenous heroin users. Early clinical trials involving methadone conducted by Dole 
and Nyswander (1965) revealed that the drug is effective in relieving narcotic hunger, 
opiate withdrawal symptoms, and it blocks the euphoric effect of heroin. The same study 
also found with a comprehensive program of rehabilitation patients saw marked 
improvements in their social life such as reconciling family relationships, gaining 
employment, and going back to school (Dole and Nyswander, 1965). Compared to 
heroin, the toxicity of methadone is relatively low and adverse physical effects are mild.  
 Although methadone maintenance has a higher success rate than strictly 
abstinence-based drug treatment, the program has several practical concerns and 
limitations worth noting (Joseph, Stancliff and Langrod, 2000). For example, increased 
rates of cocaine use have been noted among methadone maintenance patients. Also, risk 
of overdose is increased when methadone is mixed with benzodiazepines (Inciardi and 
Harrision, 2002). In some cases methadone has been linked to causing long term lung and 
respiratory problems (Inciardi and Harrision, 2002). Also, because of methadone‟s long 
half live the withdrawal process has been noted as being as severe as heroin which could 
contribute for patient‟s reluctance to detox from the drug.  There was also conflicting 
evidence regarding methadone‟s true effect on reducing crime. Questions began to 
emerge as to the validity of Dole and Nyswanders‟ early claims that methadone produced 
statistically significant effects on reducing criminal activity among participants. 
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Vorenberg and Lukoff (1973) in their study found that while 94% of addicts were not 
arrested during their first year of treatment, 80% of the same sample had not been 
arrested during the year prior to beginning methadone treatment.  As doubts began to 
emerge as to methadone‟s ability to deliver on the Nixon‟s administrations promise to 
reduce drug related crime the debate regarding heroin maintenance resurfaced once again. 
THE VERA INSTITUTE PROPOSES HEROIN TRIAL  
 The conversation involving heroin maintenance received little public attention 
since the ABA and AMA Committee of 1956 subtly suggested developing an 
experimental trial.  MacCoun and Ruter (2001) explain that in the early 1970s serious 
consideration was given to developing a heroin maintenance trial in New York City. The 
Vera Institute (1975) in its proposal recommended an experimental trial involving 300 
male heroin addicts that had been deemed treatment resistant. The study proposed 
providing injectable heroin in a clinic setting for approximately six months where the 
participants would then be transferred to either methadone maintenance or a traditional 
abstinence program. The rationale behind the proposal was to bring recalcitrant addicts 
into treatment where they could then be prepared for more conventional programs.  
 The Vera Institute had been impressed with the British System of reducing heroin 
addiction to manageable numbers and felt a similar model should be tried in a highly 
controlled clinical setting in the U.S. (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001).  The proposal 
recommended trying the model first with 30 or so patients and later expanding it to treat 
300 addicts. Although the proposal had the backing of prominent addiction specialists 
and even some law enforcement officials it was met with stiff criticisms from the medical 
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community and policy makers. There was also intense opposition from conservative 
political groups and traditional anti-drug forces (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Also, 
African Americans were suspicious of the proposal citing it was a means to reduce Black 
anger following the urban riots of the late 1960s. MaCoun and Reuter (2001) explain the 
proposal received considerably harsh press and even the liberal New York Times 
published negative stories citing a Swiss Psychiatrist who claimed that you could easily 
get up to three or four million heroin addicts within five years of the program. Ironically, 
in the 1990s the Swiss would pioneer a heroin maintenance program that would further 
legitimize it‟s standing as a feasible treatment option.  
 Proponents of the program stood behind the premise that providing heroin in a 
strict clinical setting would significantly reduce the Country‟s heroin problem. Opponents 
of the proposal wasted no time in forming a Congressional Ad Hoc Committee that 
resulted in legislation blocking the FDA from approving the trial.  MacCoun and Reuter 
(2001) explain with so many enemies and few notable supporters the proposal was 
rejected and quietly disappeared. Consequently, the hostility of the proposals‟ critics 
squashed efforts that could have better informed both sides of the debate by providing 
scientifically substantiated evidence (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Although the Vera 
Institutes‟ recommendation was unsuccessful it does illustrate the continuity of the debate 
regarding heroin maintenance.  The issue would be revisited in years to come and the 
Swiss and Dutch trials of the 1990s would provide compelling evidence as to the 
program‟s effectiveness in maintaining heroin addicts in a safe and ethical manner while 
also reducing drug related harms. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
HEROIN MAINTENANCE: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A U.S. 
EXPERIMENT 
  
 Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing through the 1990s methadone 
remained the dominant treatment approach to heroin addiction and there was a great hope 
among public health organizations that the drug would significantly reduce the addict 
population. Although studies have consistently upheld its effectiveness compared to 
abstinence based programs, methadone maintenance has received criticism for its 
inability to decrease illicit drug use among participants (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001).  In 
addition, less than half of entrants stay in methadone maintenance for more than a year 
and studies have found many participants remain involved in high risk health and crime 
behaviors while in the program. Another increasing concern for methadone maintenance 
treatment or MMT is that they are slowly becoming privatized by for-profit 
organizations.  
 In 1973, over 400 methadone clinics received funding from the federal 
government (Trebach, 1982). Today that number is considerably lower and currently less 
than half of MMTs in the U.S. are publically funded. According to SAMHSA (2010), in 
2008 half of all patients attending a MMT program were self-pay clients paying fees 
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ranging from $13-25 dollars a day making it a billion dollar a year industry. Musto 
(2002) explains, that the rise in privately owned methadone programs has resulted in a 
curtailment of effective services that has become more profit oriented and less about 
patients‟ well-being. My position is not to dismiss methadone‟s role in managing the 
addict population but it should illuminate that as a stand-alone approach it has fallen 
short. Forty plus years of MMT reveals that there is not enough compliance among 
heroin addicts to reap substantial societal and public health benefits from the program. 
The following chapter discusses Switzerland‟s experimentation with heroin maintenance 
and examines the growing trend across Western Europe to implement clinical trials of 
heroin assisted treatment.  Moreover, it touches upon the drug related harms and public 
health concerns that are a result of heroin addiction and how access heroin assisted 
treatment could reduce such harms. It also examines more recent attempts to implement 
heroin maintenance trials in the U.S. and accesses the likelihood of HAT in this country. 
THE SHOOTING GALLERY 
 The overall number of heroin users declined briefly in the late 1970s as young 
people were seeking out less socially stigmatizing drugs such as powder cocaine.  The 
large cohort of users that fueled the first heroin injection wave from 1965-1974 were 
dying out and there was a brief downward trend of new recruits to replace the old users 
(Musto, 2002). There were still over 250,000 heroin users in New York City alone and 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s the overall number of heroin addicts in the U.S. would 
stay consistent with approximately 500,000 to 750,000 users (Musto, 2002).  
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 In the 1970s a trend emerged known as the “shooting gallery” where addicts 
could gather and either buy or rent used syringes and other works to inject heroin or 
cocaine. Galleries usually operated out of abandoned houses where users gathered 
together to inject heroin, enjoy the high, and socialize. For a group of individuals who 
lived outside of the norms of conventional society the shooting gallery was simply more 
than just a place to get high. It also functioned as an integral part of the subculture. 
Consequently, the shooting gallery would also facilitate the widespread transmission of 
blood borne diseases and by the mid-1980s anywhere from a third to half of New York 
city‟s intravenous drug users were infected with HIV (Des Jarlais, 1989). Even today in 
light of what we know about HIV and its prevalence among intravenous drug users 
needle sharing is still a common practice largely because of the federal governments 
thirty year ban on funding for needle exchange programs.    
 When faced with the AIDS crisis England reacted quite differently and embraced 
a more harm reductionist approach. Musto (2002) explains the British made a conscious 
decision in the mid-1980s that preventing the spread of AIDS was far more important 
than eliminating drug use and their main priority was to curtail the spread of HIV rather 
than focus solely on abstinence. This approach conflicted with American idealism that 
proposed simply lowering expatiations of drug users would produce dismal societal 
consequences (Musto, 2002).  Other countries would follow suit and adopt harm 
reductionist policies that attempted to reduce the severity of negative outcomes 
associated with heroin addiction. The Swiss experimentation with heroin maintenance is 
of special importance because it was the first country since England that proposed 
providing pharmaceutical heroin to chronic users in a clinical setting. Today the British 
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have largely abandoned the practice and by 1975 only 4% of maintained opiate addicts 
were receiving a prescription for heroin (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001).   The Swiss 
government became intrigued with the British‟s use of heroin maintenance and even the 
U.S.‟s early experimentation with narcotics clinics leading them to develop a similar 
model as a response to its growing heroin problem.  
THE SWISS APPROACH 
 In recent years, the debate regarding heroin maintenance has become synonymous 
with the Swiss trials that began in the mid-1990s.  In the early 1980s cities such as Zurich 
and Geneva witnessed a dramatic influx of heroin addiction and as an initial response the 
Swiss government allowed the operation of an open-air drug market called the Platzpitz 
(MacCoun and Reuter, 2001).  The rationale behind the Platzpitz  or “needle park” as it 
was also called was to minimize the intrusiveness of the drug markets, and increase the 
delivery of low threshold services to users such as needle exchange and access to 
methadone treatment.  Consequently, addicts from all over Switzerland began to migrate 
to Zurich and the Platzpitz became the hub of the heroin black-market.  City officials and 
most of the local citizens categorize the Platzpitz experiment as a woeful failure. 
According to MacCoun and Reuter (2001) crime doubled in the downtown area close to 
the Platzpitz and rival gang wars resulted in an upsurge of homicides prompting the city 
to close “needle park” in 1992.   
 After closing the open air drug scene the Swiss government proposed 
implementing a heroin maintenance trial involving addicts who had failed in 
conventional treatment programs. The trials sparked harsh international controversy 
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largely from the U.S. and the International Narcotics Control Board (a UN agency) who 
warned that the experimental program would send a disastrous signal to countries in 
which opium was cultivated to increase production flooding the black-market with heroin 
(MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). The INCB director general also claimed that heroin 
maintenance would equivocate to playing with fire and urged the Swiss government to 
reconsider its proposal. Even in the face of such criticism and pressure from the 
international community the Swiss proceeded with the trials and surprisingly the majority 
of Swiss citizens supported the government‟s proposal.   In 1992, the Swiss Federal 
Office of public health authorized HAT trials in Zurich, Bern, Basel, and Geneva 
involving 1,000 heroin addicts who had failed in conventional treatment programs. In 
1994, the first heroin maintenance clinics were opened as part of a three year national 
trial that provided pharmaceutical heroin as a supplement to the Country‟s methadone 
maintenance program. MacCoun and Reuter (2001) explain outcomes of the early trials 
were positive prompting the Swiss Federal government to approve a large scale 
expansion of the program that sought to accommodate 15% of the countries some 30,000 
heroin addicts. 
 The motivation for the trials was complex and some Swiss officials explain it was 
an effort to stall a growing legalization movement. Unlike U.S. policy makers the Swiss 
government was more hesitant to be “tough” on enforcement efforts that included the 
incarceration of drug users, but they were also offended by the unsightliness of the open 
air drug scene.  The implementation of the trials was also an important step in reducing 
the prevalence of HIV among heroin addicts because participants would be given clean 
syringes and taught safe injection practices. MacCoun and Reuter (2001) explain that an 
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elaborate governance structure was developed to protect public health from any adverse 
consequences stemming from the program. For example, participants in the trial were 
ordered to render their drivers licenses to reduce incidence of driving while intoxicated. 
The Swiss government also agreed it had an ethical obligation to continue to provide 
heroin to participants after the trials were over.  
SWISS FINDINGS  
 The first randomized clinical trial of the program concluded overall heroin 
maintenance is a feasible and clinically effective treatment for heroin addicts who fail at 
conventional drug treatment (Perneger, Giner, del Rio and Mino, 1998).  The initial trial 
involved three groups of patients receiving different types of injectable opiates: 250 
received diamorphine (heroin), 250 received morphine, and 200 received methadone.  In 
the early months of the trial patients receiving injectable morphine experienced such 
discomfort the researchers removed it from the trial. There were also problems with 
injectable methadone and patients were reluctant to accept it so the final evaluation 
focused only on the experimental group receiving injectable heroin. Participants were 
required to be at least 20 years old, have two years of history injecting heroin, and failed 
two previous attempts at conventional treatment (Perneger et. al., 1998). The average 
patient was 33 years old with 12 years‟ experience injecting and had eight unsuccessful 
attempts at treatment.  An important stipulation of the trial allowed patients to choose the 
dose they felt they needed and this autonomy was believed to reduce incentive to 
supplement their dose with illicit heroin. Patients could receive heroin three times daily 
and injected under the supervision of a nurse who could monitor their health status. 
Patients were not permitted under any circumstance to take the heroin outside of the 
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clinic setting which ensured the drug would not be leaked into the black-market.  There 
was no incidence of overdose reported during the trial and compliance was also high and 
most patients met the requirements of daily attendance, and randomized drug testing 
(Perneger et. al. 1998).   
 Outcomes were generally very positive and retention in treatment was higher than 
those in methadone programs. Moreover, 69% of patients remained in the program after 
18 months and about half of those who dropped out opted for either methadone 
maintenance or abstinence based modalities. Perneger et. al. (1998) suggests, that once 
patients discovered the limitations of having unrestricted access to the drug that had been 
the focal point of their lives for so long many were finally able to quit. This finding 
strengthens the argument for heroin maintenance because it legitimizes the premise when 
addicts are given no restrictions to the drug they are able to focus on the underlying 
psychosocial causes of their addiction.  The study also revealed that synthetic heroin does 
not have a neurotoxic effect on patients any more than methadone or morphine. The trials 
proved that in most instances patients could be maintained safely on diamorphine and the 
most common side effect reported was constipation.  
 Participants in the heroin group were also given comprehensive psychosocial 
services that included individual and group counseling and access to low threshold health 
care services. Crime rates among participants also fell about 60% and this statistic was 
corroborated by local law enforcement arrest records (Perneger et. al., 1998). 
Employment outcomes also increased from 14% to 32% and many patients reported that 
participation in the trial increased their social functioning so they could pursue legitimate 
job opportunities. Mental and physical health status also improved and out of the entire 
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sample only 3 new incidences of HIV were reported which was linked to illicit cocaine 
use outside the clinic. Perneger et. al. (1998) concluded, that the patients on heroin 
maintenance no longer used street heroin and significantly reduced their use of other 
drugs such as benzodiazepines and cocaine. Social functioning also improved 
dramatically and many patients reported their housing situation improved and they 
developed more social ties outside the drug scene and improved relationships with family 
members. Dependency on street life also decreased sharply in the experimental group and 
the study found income from illegal activities such as dealing drugs, commercial sex, and 
theft decreased significantly.  These results suggest that heroin maintenance seems to 
have a broader effect on the participant‟s entire life-style by stabilizing their daily routine 
through the commitment of attending the clinic daily, giving them the opportunity for 
psychosocial support, and by keeping them away from open drug scenes (Perneger, 
Giner, del Rio and Mino, 1998). The Swiss trials also proved that the program can exist 
in an urban area with no major disturbance to surrounding neighborhoods nor did it 
increase risk to public health. 
 Overall, the Swiss trial indicates that heroin maintenance is a socially acceptable, 
effective, and feasible form of treatment for those who do not fare well in traditional 
programs. However, it should be noted that the study did reveal several limitations 
regarding heroin maintenance. One major concern was recruitment into the trial was 
lower than expected and there was less demand for the program than was initially 
anticipated (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). The low numbers of enrollment is likely a 
result of the demanding schedule of the clinic where patients were required to visit three 
times daily. A second concern is the high cost of obtaining pharmaceutical heroin and the 
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program proved to be far more expensive that methadone maintenance.  MacCoun and 
Reuter (2001) explain that the daily cost per day for each patient is about 50 Francs or 35 
dollars which is twice the cost of operating a methadone maintenance clinic.  The cost 
benefit analysis of the trial revealed that the program was saving the Swiss tax payers an 
estimated 96 francs a day in jail stays, court cost, and health care costs for each patient 
attending the program.  Moreover, the evaluation of the Swiss trials does not distinguish 
between the effects of heroin itself and the effects of other psychosocial and medical 
services offered to participants.  It is indeed possible that the comprehensive services 
might have had an impact on positive outcomes over the administration of heroin alone.  
However, it is more probable that the psychosocial services enhanced the overall 
effectiveness of the daily administration of heroin (Perneger, Giner, del Rio and Mino, 
1998).  Also, because the initial groups of injectable morphine and methadone were 
removed from the study there were no other randomized control groups to compare 
outcomes from the experimental group.  Instead, outcomes from the group receiving 
injectable heroin were compared to outcomes from nonequivalent groups of methadone 
and abstinence based programs.    
 Currently, there are 23 clinics across Switzerland that offer heroin maintenance 
serving about 7% of the country‟s overall addict population. Nordt and Stohler (2006) 
found that on average patients stay in the program about three years and afterwards less 
than 15% relapse back into daily heroin use.  There have also been significant reductions 
in heroin use in Switzerland following the implementation of HAT. For example, in 
Zurich alone from 1990 to 2002 there was an 82% reduction of daily heroin use. Nodrt 
and Stohler (2006) also explain that the decrease in heroin abuse is also a consequence of 
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fewer recruits being introduced to the drug through peer influences. Because older 
addicts were diverted into opiate substitution programs there was less incentive to 
introduce the drug to new recruits.  Arrest rates also declined significantly in the decade 
following the implantation of HAT programs. Reuter and Schnoz (2009) found that 
heroin related arrest declined from 18,000 in 1997 to 6500 in 2006.  Nordt and Stohler 
(2006) explain the Swiss approach goes far beyond providing heroin maintenance and the 
government developed a four pillar strategy that emphasized on treatment and other harm 
reduction measures. There was also a conscious effort by the Swiss government to 
change the image of heroin use from a nonconformist rebellious act to a chronic disease 
that needs therapy. The Swiss more so than any other country to date have embraced a 
continuum of harm reduction modalities and as a result they have witnessed marked 
improvements in public health as well as reductions in illicit drug use and related crime.  
REACTIONS TO THE SWISS EXPERIMENTATION WITH HAT 
 Even in spite of its methodological flaws the early evaluations of the Swiss trials 
were encouraging and substantiate the premise that heroin maintenance can effectively 
reduce the social, legal, and public health harms that are a direct result of illicit heroin 
use. The Swiss trials also made a compelling argument that heroin maintenance 
combined with the exposure to psychosocial services could facilitate a patient‟s choice to 
seek out more traditional treatment programs. When the daily chase to obtain illicit 
heroin is eliminated and the user has the autonomy to choose their dose this allowed 
participants to focus their energy on addressing the underlying psychosocial issues that 
might facilitate their drug use. The position taken here is not to imply that heroin 
maintenance is an appropriate treatment for all addicts and there are indeed risks and 
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limitations associated with the implementation of a large scale HAT program.  However, 
if we could examine heroin maintenance in terms of evidence based practices and omit 
the socially constructed ideas and fears that polarize our ability to embrace new treatment 
modalities perhaps we could engage in a constructive debate about HAT‟s potential role 
in American society.    
 In the U.S. opponents of HAT argue that giving addicts their drug of choice sets a 
dangerous precedent that would establish a slippery slope toward drug legalization.  
Trebach (1982) explains that in U.S. society it is seen as “sinful” for policymakers to take 
into account the tastes of drug users, however, those tastes must be recognized as the 
most important elements in the rational design of future policies. European countries such 
as Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Canada have 
been more accepting of this premise as each of these countries have implemented either 
HAT trials or mandated permanent maintenance programs (Fischer, Rehm, Kirst, Casas, 
Hall, Krausz, & Van Ree, 2002).  It is also important to note neither of these countries 
have legalized heroin although U.S. critics of the program frame their argument against 
HAT around the hypothetical fear that it would lead to drug legalization.   
 Instead of reacting with enthusiasm to the Swiss findings the international 
community focused primarily on the methodological weaknesses of the evaluations and 
accused the Swiss of social irresponsibility. The U.S. was among one of the programs 
most ardent critics yet these criticisms come from a country that maintains the highest 
global drug incarceration rates and the highest incidence of drug related violence 
(MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Yet little international condemnation has been directed 
toward the U.S. and it burgeoning prison population of drug offenders. Although most 
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Americans have come to the realization that the forty year “War on Drugs” has failed we 
still cling to the same policies that promote incarceration and enforcement efforts that are 
socially harmful and ultimately ineffective (Alexander, 2010). 
 The position of this thesis is not to imply that as a stand-alone program heroin 
maintenance could solve the U.S. drug problem or even eradicate illicit heroin use. But, 
conducting carefully regulated clinically controlled trials of HAT in the U.S. could ignite 
a national debate promoting a continuum of harm reductionist strategies that could 
ultimately reduce our reliance on incarceration and enforcement efforts. In the U.S. there 
remains an implied tolerance of ineffective socially harmful institutions and drug policies 
(MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Even in spite of the positive findings from Swiss trials 
there is little tolerance for alternative programs such as HAT because American idealism 
clings to the notion that all addicts can live drug free lives if they are presented with 
enough punitive sanctions and treatment attempts.  This type of circular reasoning 
implies that our country‟s drug laws and policies are more aligned with political 
ideologies as opposed to the pragmatic evaluation of what works.  However, if we look to 
our European counterparts we can see an emerging trend that promotes harm reduction 
policies which is reshaping how drug abuse is approached.   
NAOMI TRIALS IN VANCOUVER AND MONTREAL  
 Currently in the U.S. there is a growing acceptance of harm reductionist policies 
such as needle exchange programs, naloxone distribution and increased access to 
methadone and suboxone substitution therapies. There are also a growing number of 
harm reduction alliance groups who advocate for the development of HAT trials although 
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the issue remains an inflammatory concept and the majority of the political and medical 
establishment still ardently oppose it largely on moral and ideological grounds.  The U.S. 
debate regarding HAT has received renewed interest after the Canadian government 
proposed implementing trials in Vancouver and Montreal.  The Canadian trials illustrate 
an important milestone in the trajectory of HAT because it was the first time such an 
approach was attempted in North America since the old U.S. narcotics clinics.  
 The motivation for the Vancouver trials stemmed largely from the city‟s 
burgeoning addicted population located in the East Hastings neighborhood in the 
downtown east side of the city.  In 2008, it was estimated that over 40% of the 10,000 
East Hastings residents were HIV positive largely as a result of IV drug use (Adilman 
and Kliewer, 2000).  The Vancouver neighborhood also known as “Skid Row” maintains 
the highest incidence of HIV in the industrialized world.  There are an estimated 5,000 IV 
drug users living in East Hasting costing the city millions in health care, law enforcement 
efforts and lost productivity.  In light of the Swiss and Dutch experience with heroin 
assisted treatment the North American Opiate Medication Initiative (NAOMI) proposed a 
similar model be tried in Vancouver and Montreal.  
 The NAOMI trials although controversial and harshly criticized by U.S. officials 
revealed overall positive findings and marked reductions in illicit drug use and criminal 
activity among participants.  The trials began in 2005 and concluded in 2008 and 
involved 251 participants with 115 receiving injectable diamorphine (heroin) and 111 
receiving oral methadone.  The study found a 67% reduction in illicit drug use or other 
illegal activities among the experimental group of injectable heroin compared to 47% 
receiving oral methadone (Oviedo-Joekes, Brissette, Marsh, Lauzon, Guh, Anis and 
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Schechter, 2009). The same study concluded that the diamorphine group had significant 
improvements over the oral methadone group with respect to medical and psychiatric 
status, economic stability, employment situation and family and social relations. These 
findings substantiate that diamorphine has a treatment effect beyond simply reducing 
illicit drug use and involvement in illegal activities. 
 The NAOMI trials received a hostile reaction from the Bush Administration and 
Drug Czar John Walters called the experiment "state sponsored suicide" (Gartry, Oviedo-
Jokes, Laliberte, and Schechter, 2009). But, evidence from program evaluations reveal 
there was not a single fatality during the trial involving the experimental group receiving 
heroin.  From the naive U.S. perspective it would be simpler if everyone could just say no 
to drugs.  And it is this basic assumption that is driving the majority of our nation‟s drug 
policies with little regard to science, innovation or compassion.  Ironically enough, many 
of the countries who utilize HAT were in fact inspired by the old U.S. narcotic clinics 
although the role of these clinics is largely omitted in the modern debate involving heroin 
maintenance.  Providing HAT in the U.S. could help to reach heroin dependent persons 
who remain outside the current treatment system and who contribute disproportionately 
to health care and criminal justice cost (Gartry, Oviedo-Jokes, Laliberte, and Schechter, 
2009).  Access to HAT could also increase contact with vital mental and health care 
services while also providing a humane and cost effective treatment modality. 
 Another consideration is that although HAT has proven to be feasible and 
effective in well organized and wealthy European countries, it could prove difficult to 
implement in diverse cultural and political societies such as the U.S. Perhaps the recent 
findings of the NAOMI trials could provide a counter argument to this premise because 
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the U.S. and Canada are more comparable in terms of social context.  MacCoun and 
Reuter (2001) touch upon another consideration and explain the argument for heroin 
maintenance presents a major ethical paradox.  For instance, there is something strange 
about the notion that on one hand you prohibit a drug, but then an exception is made for 
those who cause sufficient damage to themselves and society as a consequence of their 
violation to prohibition. This paradox alone does not make maintenance a bad policy 
however it does raise some ethical concerns that could hamper efforts to implement it in 
the United States (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). 
IS AN EXPERIMENT LIKELY? 
 A compelling case for a HAT in the U.S. has not been made since the Vera 
Institute proposed a trial in New York City in the 1970s.  But, in 1998 researchers at John 
Hopkins University, along with drug policy experts from around the world gathered at the 
New York Academy of Medicine to discuss the feasibility of a HAT trial in the U.S. 
Supporters of the program argued Baltimore would be an appropriate setting for such an 
experiment because the city has traditionally experienced high rates of heroin abuse and 
drug related crime.  Baltimore‟s Health Commissioner Dr. Peter Beilenson publically 
supported the program and advocated that the study be attempted in light of the positive 
findings from the Swiss trials. The initiative was also supported by the Lindesmith Center 
who offered funding for the trial if it received approval from the Food and Drug 
Administration (Shane, 1998).  The proposal was squashed before it had the chance to be 
considered for FDA approval due to the outcry of political opposition that argued giving 
addicts heroin would send a disastrous message that would undermine prohibition efforts. 
One supporter of the Baltimore initiative explains that the biggest prohibition in the 
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United States is not on drugs but instead the discussion of new solutions and the rejection 
of the proposal substantiates this claim (Shane, 1998).  However, it would not be the last 
time the City of Baltimore would attempt such a proposal and the issue resurfaced again a 
decade later. 
  In 2009, drug policy expert Peter Reuter from the University of Maryland 
revisited the issue by conducting a feasibility study for the city of Baltimore.  In 
coordination with the Abell Foundation, Reuter made a case for implementing an 
experimental trial and explained that heroin maintenance could remove 10% of 
Baltimore‟s most troubled heroin addicts leading to substantial reductions in crime and 
other issues that adversely affect the city.  Reuter‟s proposal was dismissed by Baltimore 
officials as being a radical endeavor that lacked evidence (Smith, 2009). The rejection of 
Baltimore proposal illustrates the uphill battle advocates of the program face even in spite 
of the positive finding regarding HAT‟s effectiveness.  
 The recent fatal heroin overdose of famous actor Phillip Seymour Hoffman has 
facilitated a renewed interest on the subject. Although heroin addiction has been steadily 
increasing over the past ten years the issue has received little attention from the Obama 
administration or the media until Hoffman‟s death. Yet, the famous actor‟s overdose 
represents only one of the estimated 10,000 heroin related deaths annually.  Between 
2006 and 2010 heroin overdose deaths have increased 45% and heroin use has increased 
79% overall between 2007 and 2012. And in cities such as Cleveland heroin related 
deaths are up 400 percent (Markon, 2014). Some experts explain the renewed interest in 
heroin is a consequence of the crackdown on prescription opiates. The lack of 
pharmaceutical opiates such as oxycodone has led many users to try a cheaper and more 
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powerful substitute, heroin (Markon, 2014).  A similar trend occurred during the early 
1900s when opium and cocaine were banned leaving users in search of an alternative 
such as heroin which would facilitated the first wave of heroin addiction in the United 
States (Courtwright, 1982).  Attorney General Eric Holder addressed the issue in a recent 
Washington Post interview and explained that the heroin problem was of top priority for 
the DOJ although he only proposed increasing enforcement efforts and improving access 
to drug treatment and prevention (Markon, 2014). Holder gave no indication that 
alternative approaches such as HAT were being considered.  
 At present, prospects for heroin maintenance in the U.S. are unlikely but not 
outside of the realm of possibility. In the current political climate there seems to be little 
room for new innovative ideas regarding drug treatment and we continue to support 
policies that have repeatedly proven ineffective and socially harmful.  In order for a HAT 
trial to matriculate there would need to be a considerable level of acceptance from the 
FDA, the National Institute of Drug Abuse in addition to local and federal political 
support.  The growing implementation of HAT in European countries and more recently 
in Canada could strengthen the case for a U.S. experiment as the program continues to 
produce positive outcomes. It is however ironic that a country who once supported the 
use of narcotic maintenance and was the first to implement methadone maintenance is so 
resistant to a program that could considerably reduce the harms, human suffering and 
significant economic cost that are a direct result of illicit heroin abuse and its control. 
There is indeed something troubling about a country who spends more resources, and 
energy on a solution to heroin addiction that produces more harm and cost than the issue 
itself causes. 
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